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SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 
Petitioner/Respondent 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and PAULA MCQUOWN, 
Respondents/Appellant. 
Case No. 20692 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the findings, conclusions and order of the 
district court are independent of and supersede the decision of 
the Industrial Commission in a trial de novo in a discrimination 
matter under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
34-35-1, et seq. (1953 as amended)? 
2. Whether the decision of the district court 
following a trial de novo in a discrimination matter under Utah 
Code Ann. §34-35-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) is to be given 
deference by the Utah Supreme Court unless the findings clearly 
preponderate against the evidence? 
3. Whether the findings and decision of the district 
court in this case are supported by competent and substantial 
evidence and do not clearly preponderate against the evidence? 
4. Whether the district court applied the proper legal 
standard in formulating its opinion and decision? 
5. Whether the proper remedy, in the case of 
reversible errorr is to remand to the district court for further 
proceedings? 
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION 
IS DETERMINATIVE 
This case involves an interpretation of Utah's Anti-
Discrimination Actf Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended) and particularly the provisions for judicial review by 
trial de novo in the district court found in §34-35-8. This act 
is reproduced in its entirety as Appendix 1 without 1985 
amendments which have no bearing on the issues presented. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This i s an appeal from a decision of the Honorable 
Scot t Daniels r D i s t r i c t Judge r Third Jud ic i a l D i s t r i c t Courtf 
following a t r i a l de novo of a case brought under the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. §34-35-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended) containing a l l ega t ions of sex discr iminat ion/ age 
discr iminat ion/ and i l l e g a l r e t a l i a t i o n against the University of 
Utah by Paula McQuown ("McQuown")/ a former employee of the 
Unive r s i ty ' s public t e l e v i s i o n s t a t ion / KUED ("KUEDn). 
In 1980 McQuown f i l ed a complaint with the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division of the Indus t r i a l Commission of Utah 
against KUEDf a l leging sex and age discr iminat ion and i l l e g a l 
r e t a l i a t i o n in v io l a t i on of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Actf 
Utah Code Ann. §34-35-1 et seq. (1953 as amended)/ T i t l e VII of 
the Civi l Rights Act of 1964/ 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967/ 29 U.S.C. §620 e t 
seq. The or ig ina l a l l ega t ions arose out of McQuown1s f a i l u r e to 
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be promoted to a position filled in October, 1980, but later were 
expanded to include charges of illegal retaliation and further 
sex and age discrimination allegations arising out of subsequent 
disciplinary actions against McQuown culminating in her 
termination from KUED in January, 1982. 
In the Spring of 1982 a hearing before Administrative 
Law Judge Edward T. Wells was held pursuant to the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act. Approximately six days of hearings were held 
following which the Administrative Law Judge, Edward T. Wells, 
took the matter under advisement. 
One year later, on April 21, 1983, Mr. Wells issued 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a recommendation in 
which he found in favor of McQuown on the age and retaliation 
claims but in favor of the University as to the sex 
discrimination charge. By order dated August 17, 1983, the 
Industrial Commission adopted Wells1 Findings, Conclusions and 
Recommendations. 
On September 16, 1983, KUED filed a petition in the 
Third Judicial District Court for a trial de novo of the 
Industrial Commission Findings and Order pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-35-8 (1953 as amended). 
Following a complete review of the Industrial 
Commission record, the court on February 13, 1985, heard 
testimony from the three principal witnesses in the case, the 
complainant, McQuown, the Station Manager and McQuown's 
Supervisor during part of the time in question, Fred Esplin, and 
Jeannine Gregoire, who filled the position of Manager of 
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Advertising and Public Information, the position for which 
McQuown had applied. In this position Ms. Gregoire acted as 
McQuown's immediate supervisor for approximately thirteen months 
after which time she recommended McQuown's termination. At the 
conclusion of this hearing the district court found in favor of 
KUED, concluding that McQuown had not sustained her burden of 
proof. 
Following further hearings relative to the form and 
substance of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, on 
April 11, 1985, the district court entered Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order finding against McQuown and in 
favor of KUED, following which, on May 10, 1985, McQuown filed a 
Notice of Appeal to this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For a summary of facts based on the record, refer to 
KUEDns Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appendix 
3 (Record pp. 102-126 (hereafter R. ), and the district court's 
Findings of Fact, Appendix 2 (R. 88-99). The following factual 
argument is intended to supplement those facts. Citations are 
sometimes to the date and page number of the transcript or 
exhibit number in the Industrial Commission record (E.g. 4/19 
page 10; (P-l) [plaintiff exhibit], R-l [respondent exhibit]) as 
well as to the record on appeal (E.g. R. 102) where possible. 
Paula McQuown (McQuown) first came to KUED in 1971 and 
was supervised generally be Rex Campbell (male, over 40; R. 195, 
4/21, p.35), the Station Manager. there were lots of changes at 
that time (R. 170, 4/19, p.10) and the work was largely 
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unstructured. Even at that time there were clashes between her 
and her immediate supervisor, Byron Openshaw (R. 172, 4/19, p. 
12). She began to develop a reputation for "being cross" (R. 
173, 4/19, p. 13) and would sometimes evidence irritation, 
agitation or anger (R. 183, 4/19, p.23). 
In the next ten years of her employment, she had ten 
supervisors, one on two separate occasions (Rex Campbell, 1971; 
Byron Openshaw, 1972 to 1976; Milt Davis, 1975; Carol Klas, 1976; 
Bob Reed, 1977; Greg Hunt, 1977; Milt Davis, 1978; Steve Smith, 
1978; Bruce Christensen, 1979; Fred Esplin, 1979-1980; Jeannine 
Gregoire, 1980-1982). 
In 1976, Byron Openshaw (male, over 40)(R. 195, 4/19, 
p. 35) criticized McQuown for failing to prioritize her work, 
assuming responsibilities not specifically assigned, and having 
difficulty with interpersonal relationships with members of the 
staff and her supervisor. She was placed on probation at that 
time (P-l). 
Milt Davis found that she took an inordinate amount of 
time to do her work, consistently missed deadlines and did not 
get along with others (R. 813-814, 5/20 pp. R. 802, 38-39). He 
was over 40 (5/20, p. 27). 
In 1977, Bob Reed (male, over 40) (R. 374, 5/21, p. 18) 
criticized her for her bad attitude towards her supervisor, and 
told her if it did not improve she would have to seek employment 
elsewhere (P-3). 
In 1978, Greg Hunt (male, under 40) (R. 374, 5/21, p. 
18) indicated that her attitude and interaction with her 
supervisor needed improvement (P-5). 
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In 1979r Steve Smith (male, under 40) (R. 374, 5/21, p. 
18), found her to be "superior" and in reorganizing the 
Department promoted her with a title change from Promotion 
Director to Manager of Publicity and Public Relations (P-7). 
this evaluation is notable because it is so much better than any 
other evaluation she had before or since, and was given by a male 
under 40 years old. 
In 1980, Fred Esplin (male, under 40) evaluated her as 
marginal and not acceptable because of her improper use of time, 
lack of fiscal and production oversight over Fanfare, a KUED 
viewer's magazine, and failure to organize and plan her work (P-
11) . 
In 1981, Fred Esplin again rated her as marginal and 
not acceptable, citing her failure to meet deadlines, failure to 
initiate a speaker's bureau, failure to plan her work, and 
failure to following internal policy relative to purchases (P-
23) . 
In 1981, Jeannine Gregoire (female, under 40) also 
evaluated McQuown as marginal and unacceptable, citing her 
failure to meet deadlines, failure to take initiative to perform 
assigned responsibilities, failure to communicate with her 
supervisor and insubordination (24-R). 
In each of these instances, McQuown responded with a 
total denial and self-justification for such an assessment. (See 
P-2, P-4, P-6, P-12, P-24, P-25). It is her own perception that 
regardless of her supervisor or position she continued to work as 
she pleased, as Promotion Director under Byron Openshaw, (R. 226; 
4/21, p. 66); Carol Klas, (R. 240, 249; 4/21, pp. 81, 89, 170); 
Bob Reed, (4/21. p. 74); Greg Hunt, (4/21, pp. 89-90); and Steve 
Smith, (R. 258; 4/21, pp. 91, 96). The change to Manager of 
Publicity and Public Relations, she regarded as nothing more than 
"official sanction to go ahead and be a manager", a capacity 
which she considers herself to have performed during her entire 
tenure at KUED (R. 258; 4/21, p. 98). Even after the 1980 
reorganization when she became Coordinator of Publicity and 
Public Relations, when there was a major shift in her 
responsibilities (including being relieved of Fanfare magazine 
which previously took two to three weeks per month, (R. 302; 
4/21, p. 143; R. 592, 604; 5/19, pp. 23, 35), she still did not 
perceive any change in her duties (R. 302; 4/21, p. 143; R. 1009, 
1049; 5/25, pp. 23, 63) except an increase in "busy work" (R. 
315; 4/21, p. 156) or "clerical dates" (R. 638; 5/19, p. 69), 
which she was not able to define (R. 1037, 1039; 5/25, pp. 51, 
53) . 
She seemed to ignore direction from her supervisors (R. 
432, 436, 449, 450, 451, 511, 554; 5/21, pp. 76, 80, 93, 94, 155, 
198; R. 1157, 1232; 5/24, pp. 83, 158), and presumed to dictate 
priorities to her supervisors. Consider her refusal to accept a 
direct assignment explained in P-28, dated September 1, 1981: 
Upcoming projects—which I have had in the 
offing for months—take precedence here, 
they make it impossible for me to concentrate 
on this. 
A. FRED ESPLIN'S SUPERVISION. 
In September, 1979, Fred Esplin came to KUED as 
Director of Marketing (R. 1076; 5/24, p.2), and supervised the 
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Managers of Fund Raising services (Jonathan Sack, male under 40) 
(R. 853; 5/20, p. 78), Advertising and Promotion (Norma Tharp, 
female under 40) (R. 853; 5/20, p. 78) and Publicity and Public 
Relations (P-9). He soon observed problems in McQuown job 
performance (R. 1229; 5/24, p. 155). In January, 1980, he 
evaluated each of these managers (P-10, 37, 39). Consistent with 
his practice, he observed both strengths and weaknesses in each 
of them (R. 1092-1095; 5/24, pp. 18-21). He felt the best 
regarding Norma Tharp1s performance and the most concern for 
McQuown (R. 1108; 5/24, p. 34). Jonathan Sack also had problems 
but in different areas and to different degrees (R. 1092-1095, 
1103-1104; 5/24, pp. 18-22, 29-30). 
McQuown was notified that she was ineffective in 
planning special events and in fiscal and production oversight of 
Fanfaref including the timeliness of it (P-10). Fanfare was 
running at a $6,000 deficit (R. 1086, 1117; 5/24, pp. 12, 43) and 
there were numerous complaints that it was reaching the 
recipients late (R. 1083, 1098, 1239; 5/24, pp. 14, 24, 165). 
She was placed on probation and received only a limited 
salary increase (R-3, P-13). 
Of twelve tasks specifically assigned, she completed or 
satisfied about half and seemed to have made an effort. Fred 
Esplin gave her an 11 per cent increase, which was the station 
average (P-16, R. 1109; 5/24, p. 35). 
Although Jonathan Sack had problems in his work 
performance, he was not placed on probation (R. 1107; 5/24, p. 
33). Both Jonathan and McQuown were "developing" at that time 
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(R. 1237; 5/24, p. 163) but i t i s impossible to compare and 
quantify the i r performance because t h e i r s were not the same kinds 
of problems and involved r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of d i f fe rent weight (R. 
1094-1095, 1103; 5/24, pp. 20-21, 29). His problems did not 
involve the f a i l u r e to accomplish h is work but the manner in 
which he did i t (he delegated too much and was abrasive) and he 
responded be t t e r to the construct ive c r i t i c i sms of his supervisor 
(R. 1104; 5/24, p . 30). Furthermore, he produced and obtained 
r e s u l t s which are demonstrable. For example, under his 
d i r ec t ion , membership in the "Friends of KUED" increased from 
10,000 to 22,000, donations increased $257,000 to $800,000, 
income from underwriters increased from $15,000 to $200,000 and 
adver t is ing income in the program guide increased from zero to 
$80,000 (R. 1105; 5/24. p . 31). 
In con t ras t , McQuown did j u s t the minimum, continuing 
$6,000 over budget and missing deadlines (R. 1117; 5/24 pp. 43-
46) . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n between the types of problems observed 
and the manner of response i s so s t r ik ing between McQuown and 
Jonathan Sack t ha t any difference in treatment i s obviously a 
r e s u l t of difference in problems, both kind and degree. Any 
attempt to imply tha t because Jonathan Sack i s male and under 40 
tha t McQuown therefore i s unfair ly t rea ted i s without bas i s . 
Fred Esp l in ' s philosophy i s to praise the good and 
respond immediately to problems without regard to age or sex. 
Norma Tharp, Jonathan Sack and McQuown were a l l t rea ted the same 
and the only difference i s in the nature of the i r problems and 
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the manner in which they responded. If, on the basis of this 
past history, McQuown seriously considered herself to be doing a 
commendable job in July, 1980, simply because she received an 
average increase in salary after having been placed on probation 
then she is simply being unrealistic by accepting any and all 
compliments and ignoring any and all criticisms. 
Problems continueds. That summer she failed to 
complete an important assignment (P-ll, 13; R-4, 6; R. 1223; 
5/24, p. 149), and was late with an important press kit (R-7). 
B. REORGANIZATION. 
For some time, Fred Esplin had contemplated a 
reorganization of the Marketing Department for several reasons. 
State funding was staying at about level but federal funding was 
diminishing drastically. Fund raising had to increase. 
Initially the change might cost more—but it would allow greater 
energy to go into fund raising (R. 888; 5/20, p. 113; R. 406; 
5/21, p. 50). Furthermore, Esplin felt a need to coordinate all 
advertising, publicity, promotion and public relations and also 
felt a need to balance the skills and desires of individuals, 
particularly McQuown who had not done well her management roles 
involving fiscal and production oversight for Fanfare and had 
complained of being overworked but seemed to do well at her 
public and press relations. 
The reorganization realigned duties between the Manger 
of Advertising and Promotions (Norma Tharp) McQuown and their 
shared assistant, Becky Sowards. Becky Sowards was promoted to a 
new title of Coordinator or Editorial Services and assigned 
responsibility for Fanfare, McQuown was given some additional 
duties with KUER (the radio station) and her title changed to 
Coordinator of Publicity and Public Relations. A person 
responsible for this entire area was to be placed in a line 
position between the Director of Marketing (Esplin) and these two 
positions to be called Manager of Advertising and Public 
Information. This position would involve much of what Norma 
Tharp had been doing plus some supervisory and administrative 
responsibilities. The position could have been offered 
internally to Norma Tharp (R. 1205-1206; 5/24, pp. 131-132), but 
because she would have to supervise McQuown she declined and left 
the Station prior to the reorganization taking effect (R. 903-
904; 5/20, pp. 128-129). 
Although the grade, step and pay level of the new 
position entitled Coordinator of Publicity and Public Relations 
remained the same, with no loss of pay (R. 384-385; 5/21, pp. 28-
29), McQuown considered this a "demotion", perceiving it as a 
loss of status, which it probably was (R. 883-884; 5/20, pp. 108-
109). However, it was impossible to accommodate her skills, 
respond to her complaints of being overworked and reduce her 
workload, and at the same time make her a Manager while 
maintaining the consistency and logic in a reorganization. 
The Manager's position was advertised, partly because 
two jobs were being combined instead of just one being upgraded 
(R. 1205; 5/24, p. 131). The University policy encourages 
promotion from within "whenever possible." (P-21). The policy 
gives a preference to University employees, not a vested right 
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(R. 1249-1250; 5/24, pp. 175-176; R. 380-381; 5/21, pp. 24-25). 
There was no violation of the University policy in advertising 
the new Manager position or in selecting from outside the 
University (R. 885-887; 5/20, pp. 110-112; R. 1145-1148, 1208, 
1249-1251; 5/24, pp. 71-74, 134, 175-177). 
McQuown was not precluded from applying and, in fact 
she did apply on the very last possible day (R. 1142; 5/24, p. 
68). 
C. HIRING OF JEANNINE GREGOIRE. 
There were 58 applicants for this position and 
consistent with University procedure the Personnel Department 
screened out all applicants who were not "minimally qualified11 
(R. 1145; 5/24, p. 70). Those who were "minimally qualified" 
were the ones that met the specific, objective criteria as 
advertised relative to Bachelor's degree and four years 
experience (R. 1146; 5/24, p. 72). there were eight such 
persons, including McQuown and Jeannine Gregoire. Jeanine 
Gregoire was selected. 
In reaching his decision Esplin contacted prior 
supervisors of both Gregoire and McQuown (R. 1150; 5/24, p. 76. 
In all cases, Gregoire's references were highly complimentary. 
Only Rex Campbell gave a positive recommendation for McQuown, and 
Milt Davis, Byron Openshaw, Greg Hunt and Steve Smith all were 
negative. Furthermore, Esplin had supervised her directly. As 
with all candidates, Esplin considered on-air copy and 
advertising ability, managerial ability and fiscal responsibility 
as key skills. (R. 1208-1209, 1242, 1247, 1248; 5/24, pp. 134-
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135, 168, 173-174). Jeannine Gregoire supplied all the requested 
items and demonstrated the necessary skills (R. 1153, 1252; 5/24, 
pp. 79, 178) , while McQuown failed to provide any advertising 
material and was deficient in key areas (R. 1143, 1151; 5/24, pp. 
69, 77; R. 1040; 5/25, p. 54). 
Her work deteriorated. On October 28, 1980, Esplin 
learned she had missed an important press kit deadline (R-ll). 
On November 10, 1980, he learned that Fanfares were late (R-13) 
and on November 25,1980, he became aware of another missed 
deadline. She was notified deep concerns (R-14) and placed on 
probation. 
The next day, November 26, 1980, the last day to file a 
charge (R. 630; 5/19, p. 61; § 34-35-7 [now repealed], she filed 
a charge with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and EEOC 
alleging sex and age discrimination in the failure to select her 
for the position of Manager of Advertising and Public 
Information, the threatened termination, reorganization and 
alleged demotion. McQuown admits that the November 25th 
memorandum had a bearing on her filing such a charge. It appears 
that the charge was filed in "retaliation" against Esplin for 
continuing to bring her attention to her failures (R. 634; 5/19, 
p. 65) . 
D. JEANNINE GREGOIRE1 S SUPERVISION. 
On December 4, 1980, Jeannine Gregoire began work. 
Esplin avoided telling her that McQuown had applied for her job, 
had filed a charge of discrimination, or anything relative to his 
own personal assessment of her to avoid prejudicing McQuown. (R. 
1155; 5/24, p. 81). 
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However, from the very outset, Gregoire noticed a 
condescending and unresponsive attitude from McQuown. Gregoire 
inquired of Esplin who then explained that she had applied for 
the job and filed a discrimination charge. (R. 430-432; 5/21, 
pp. 74-76). This had no bearing on Gregoire's feelings since she 
had, herself, once filed a charge of discrimination against her 
employer (R. 434-435; 5/21, pp. 78-79). Gregoire later asked if 
her own position were in jeopardy as a result of the charge. She 
was assured by Fred Esplin that it was not. the subject was 
never raised again and was apparently of no concern to Jeannine 
(R. 989; 5/25, p. 3). 
In discussing the problem, Esplin suggested that 
Gregoire should document assignments and responses. This has 
been a standard practice of both Esplin and Gregoire relative to 
persons they supervised when problems were apparent (R. 442; 
5/21, p. 86). Esplin has only placed two people on probation, 
McQuown and a male under 40 (R. 1106; 5/24, p. 32; R. 378; 5/21, 
p. 22), and in each case the same procedure of documenting work 
performance was used. Similarly, Gregoire has followed the same 
practice with regard to another employee (male under 40) in a 
prior position (R. 483; 5/21, p. 127). The existence of these 
memoranda does not indicate any attempt to damage McQuown but, 
instead, is indicative of the existence of problems and an 
attempt to resolve them. 
Esplin evaluated McQuown in January 1981 as "marginal" 
(P-23). Later evaluations were to be given by her direct 
supervisor, Gregoire (R. 1158-1159; 5/24, pp. 84-85). 
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McQuown's attitude toward her supervisor, as well as 
her job performancer continued to deteriorate and became a source 
of great frustration to Gregoire. She became increasingly 
unresponsive (R-16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22; R. 1024, 1026; 5/25. pp. 
38, 40) and insubordinate (R-19, 23, 28; R. 538, 593; 5/21, pp. 
182, 187). 
Based on this, Gregoire recommended termination for 
McQuown but the University Personnel Department recommended a 
lesser sanction, of suspension for one day without pay. Every 
attempt was made to give her the benefit of the doubt, give her 
warnings and assistance to improve and succeed (R-25; R. 771-774; 
5/19, pp. 203-206; R. 840-844; 5/20, pp. 65-69). But she 
continued insubordinate (R-29, 30, 33) and unresponsive (R-12, 
38); R. 375, 407, 545; 5/21, pp. 19, 51, 189; R. 1095; 5/25, p. 
21) . 
E. TERMINATION. 
With the accumulation of this abysmal work record, it 
appeared intolerable to continue McQuown in her position. Esplin 
"anguished" over the recommendation by her supervisor that she be 
terminated because he knew of the potential personal impact on 
McQuown and also was realistic concerning the fact that a 
discrimination charge had been filed and the sensitivity involved 
in such a matter (R. 1163; 5/24, p. 89). Nevertheless, the 
history of her failure to perform in her position was compelling. 
She had had her job restructured and workload reduced several 
times to accommodate her complaints of being overworked and had 
been given every opportunity to succeed (R. 802, 834; 5/20, pp. 
27, 59). 
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On January 12, 1982, McQuown was terminated from her 
position at KUED. She was replaced by Brenda Rogers (female 
under 40). 
By reference to her job description (R-8), McQuown was 
terminated for failure to respond to responsibilities. Her 
failures included the following. 
She did not plan and initiate an aggressive and 
comprehensive publicity and public relations program (R. 1164; 
5/24, p. 90). 
She did not prepare press kits and press releases. Of 
thirty underwriters, fewer than ten had publicity which was a 
source of great concern. Very little was done on the program 
descriptions either. In explanation, she suggests that many were 
done in cooperation with Doug Jensen but she admits that her 
supervisors were not fully informed of that fact. She also 
acknowledges that occasionally she "did not have time to write 
those press releases" (R. 1168; 5/24, p. 94). 
She failed to create a "speaker's bureau" (R-l, 8, 37, 
38; R. 620, 624; 5/19, pp. 51, 55; R. 1168-1169; 5/24, pp. 93-
94) . 
She failed to create special promotional campaigns 
involving off-air promotion. Of many possibilities only a booth 
at the UEA Conference was established (R. 1168; 5/24, p. 94). 
She failed to perform "other duties as assigned". As 
reported above, and to Esplin by her supervisor, she was not 
responsive nor cooperative and resisted direction. In fact, she 
was clearly insubordinate (R. 1169; 5/24, p. 95; supra). 
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All of these duties are clearly in her job description 
(R-8; R. 1225-1226; 5/24, p. 151). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's judgment in a matter arising under 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, is based on a trial de novo on 
the record and other evidence as determined by the court. The 
district court is the fact finder and its findings and judgment 
supersede any order made by the Industrial Commission. There is 
no justification in the statute or cases decided by this court 
interpreting the statute to relegate the district court to the 
position of an intermediate appellate court as advocated by 
McQuown. The determination of the district court in such a trial 
de novo under the Anti-Discrimination Act is given deference by 
the Utah Supreme Court unless the determination clearly 
preponderates against the evidence. 
Furthermore, McQuown did not object in the district 
court to the role of the district court as a de novo trier of 
facts and should not now for the first time on appeal argue the 
unsupported theory that the district court is an intermediate 
court of appeals in such cases. 
The findings and judgment of the court are abundantly 
supported by substantial and competent evidence before the 
district court. 
The district court properly analyzed the case under the 
appropriate legal standards relative to an individual claim of 
disparate treatment allegedly motivated by discrimination. 
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Even if any error were found that justified reversal or 
further proceedings, the appropriate procedure would be for 
remand to the district court, not reversal and final decision in 
the Supreme Court as proposed by McQuown. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S JUDGMENT SUPERSEDES THE 
DECISION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND IS 
GIVEN DEFERENCE BY THIS COURT UNLESS IT 
CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST THE EVIDENCE. 
McQuown advocates in her brief that the district 
court's role in reviewing the decision from the Industrial 
Commission under the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act should be 
relegated to that of an intermediate appellate court in making 
factual determinations. This would limit the district court's 
determination of factual matters to a consideration of whether 
there was evidence to support the Industrial Commission findings, 
giving deference thereto absent clear error. 
Such a proposal is clearly contrary to the statute and 
would constitute a major departure from decisions of this court 
interpreting the statute. 
The Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, set forth in its 
entirety in the appendix provides for judicial review of a final 
order of the Industrial Commission by petition for trial de novo 
in the district court. The filing of such petition, operates as 
a stay of the enforcement of the order of the commission, and any 
district court judgment supersedes any order made by the 
commission. In applicable part, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-8 (1953 
as amended) provides as follows: 
(1) Any ... respondent claiming to be 
aggrieved by a final order of the commission ... 
may obtain judicial review thereof ... as provided 
in this section. 
* * * 
(3) Such judicial review ... shall be 
initiated by ... a petition for a trial de novo in 
the district court.... 
(4) The filing of such petition in the 
district court shall operate as a stay of 
enforcement of the order of the commission.... 
(5) ... The commission shall file in the 
district court ... the entire case file.... 
(6) Upon the conclusion of a trial de novo in 
the district court or other proceedings which 
appropriately dispose of all issues of fact and of 
law, the district court shall enter findings of 
fact, conclusions of law and judgment and 
decree.... The parties may waive findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The judgment entered in 
the district court shall supersede any order made 
by the commission. 
(7) The jurisdiction of the court shall be 
exclusive, and its judgment and order shall be 
final, subject to review by the Supreme Court as 
provided by law. 
* * * 
(12) The provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, so far as applicable, and not in 
conflict with this chapter, apply to proceedings 
in the courts under the provisions of this 
chapter. 
Two major decisions of this court interpreting this 
statute are conspicuously missing from McQuowns's brief, although 
one was later included as an amendment by letter of October 17, 
1985 relative to an unrelated point. These are the cases of 
Beehive Medicel Electronics v, Industrie! Commission, 583 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1978) and Salt Lake City Corporation v. Confer. 674 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1983). These cases clarify the proper role of the 
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district court and the Supreme Court in Industrial Commission 
Anti-Discrimination cases. 
in Beehive Medical Electronics, suprar an appeal from a 
district court finding in which the district court agreed with 
the commission against the employer, this court defined such 
proceedings as equitable in nature and held that district court 
findings would not be reversed unless they clearly preponderatea 
against the evidence. There was no reference to the Industrial 
Commission findings or any weight to which they were entitled. 
We hold that the findings are supported by 
competent and substantial evidence and, under 
equitable principles of review, we further 
hold that the evidence does not clearly 
preponderate against the district courts' 
findings as is required for a reversal in an 
equity case. 
Id. 583 P.2d 59-60 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, the case of Salt Lake City Corporation v. 
Confer, supra, refers to the role of the district court and the 
weight of its findings. That case primarily involved an 
interpretation of the terms "handicap" and "impairment" in the 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. It arose out of the termination of 
Evelyn Confer from her job with the city because of a latent 
spinal condition. The Industrial Commission found that the city 
had discriminated against Confer. On a petition for a trial de 
novo to the district court, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the city and an appeal was taken to the Utah 
Supreme Court. In briefly commenting on the role of the district 
court this Court said: 
The purpose of that requirement [filing of the 
entire commission case file with the district 
court] must be to permit the district court to 
conduct its trial de novo on the basis of the 
record before the commission, CF. Pledger v. Coy, 
Utah, 626 P.2d 415 (1981). This would not prevent 
the district court from adding to that record by 
receiving additional evidence if it elected to do 
so. 
... As the fact finder in this equitable 
matterr the district court had the option of 
affirming the commission's findings, as was done 
in Beehive Medical Electronics v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 583 P.2d 53,55,57 (1978), or of 
making its owp findings. 
674 P.2d at 634, note 1 (emphasis added). 
A clear reading of the statute and the cases that have 
interpreted the statute establishes that it is the prerogative of 
the district court in a trial de novo from a determination by the 
Industrial Commission under the Anti-Discrimination Act 
independently to determine facts and enter judgment thereon. 
After reviewing the record and receiving any additional evidence 
it might elect to receive, the district court has the option of 
affirming the commission findings or making its own findings. It 
is the primary fact finder in an equitable proceeding, not an 
intermediate appellate court. The findings of the commission are 
superseded and the findings of the district court are given 
deference by this court and in keeping with well established 
rules of appellate review in such cases will not reverse or 
superimpose its own judgment on the district court findings 
unless they clearly preponderate against the evidence. (See 
Point III). 
The nature of a "trial de novo" is dictated by the 
wording and context of the statute in which it appears, Pledger 
v. Cox, 626 P.2d 419 (Utah 1981). All of the cases cited by 
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McQuown in support of her theory that the review on the record in 
this context requires deference to the Industrial Commission by 
the district court are not applicable because they involve 
statutes, circumstances and issues completely different from and 
unrelated to the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act. For example, Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983), and Denver and Rio Grande 
Western Railroad Company v. Public Service Commission, 98 Utah 
431, 100 P.2d 552 (1940) involve direct appeals from an 
administrative agency (Public Service Commission) to the Supreme 
Court under a statute that specially describes the scope of 
review. Other cases cited, such as the Oregon cases, involve 
direct appellate court review of a lower court. These cases have 
no relevance, and are unpersuasive with regard to the district 
court's relationship to the Industrial Commission in this kind of 
case. 
POINT II 
MCQUOWN DID NOT OBJECT BELOW TO THE ROLE OF 
THE DISTRICT COURT AS A DE NOVO TRIER OF 
FACTS AND SHOULD NOT NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ARGUE THE UNSUPPORTED THEORY THAT THE 
DISTRICT COURT IS AN INTERMEDIATE COURT OF 
APPEALS IN SUCH CASES. 
Generally this Court will not rule on alleged error in 
the district court unless the complaining party first 
specifically raises the issue in the lower court to allow 
argument and ruling thereon. Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium 
Company, 704 P.2d 573 (Utah 1985); E,A, Strout Western Realty v. 
W.C. Foy & Sons. 665 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1983). Even in equity 
cases, where the role of this court is expanded as to factual 
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issues, see Beehive Medical Electronics v. Industrial Commission. 
supra; Salt Lake City Corporation v. Confer, supra, it will still 
review alleged errors of law not properly raised below only if 
there is substantial and prejudicial error or such abuse of 
discretion that results in inequity or injustice, Berger v. 
Berger. P.2d (#18627, Utah, July 8, 1985). 
Not only did McQuown not object to the district court 
acting as a de novo trier of facts based on the record and any 
independent evidence the court wished to consider, but in a very 
pertinent dialogue between the court and counsel for McQuown, the 
court was specifically told it was not limited to an intermediate 
appellate review. 
MR. LETA: ... In that case [Beehive 
Medical] the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
District Court's affirmation of the order of 
the Industrial Commission. It determined in 
that case that the appropriate standard to be 
applied was whether the findings of the 
Commission had been supported by competent 
and substantial evidence, and that the 
evidence did not clearly preponderate against 
the findings. That is set fort on pages 59 
and 60. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Are you saying that case, 
this Beehive case says that the standard of 
review of the Industrial Commission hearing 
is whether the findings were supported by 
substantial evidence rather than— 
MR. LETA: I may have misspoke on that. 
What the appellate Court said is it's 
standard for reviewing the District Court was 
based— 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. LETA: —was based on the findings 
that the District Court's decision was based 
op competent and substantial evidence, and 
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that the determination of the District Court 
that the evidence did not clearly 
preponderate against the findings. In 
essence, they applied the old Nelson v. 
Nelson standard, applicable in equity cases 
in deciding whether or not the decision of 
the District Court should be upheld. 
THE COURT: I see. 
MR. LETA: But the statute does give the 
Court the discretion to review the findings 
end review the law end come up with en 
independent determination of whether or not 
the Commission's order ought to be affirmed 
or revised in some manner consistent with the 
Court's perception of the case, consistent 
with the Court's perception of the applicable 
law. 
R. 928-930, Tr. Wed. February 13f 1985 (emphasis added). Having 
specifically (and correctly) instructed the court that it had the 
discretion to make an independent determination of the case 
regardless of the commission's order, it does not appear timely 
to argue the opposite and unsupported position on appeal. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT FINDINGS ARE ABUNDANTLY 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
The evidence consisting of the record from the 
Industrial Commission including transcripts and exhibits and the 
testimony of McQuown, Esplin and Gregoire in the district court 
are consistent with and support the findings of the district 
court. 
It is obvious that McQuown has her own interpretation 
of the facts which she asserts could support a finding in her 
favor. However, it is the district court, not the complainant 
that is charged with the responsibility and possesses the 
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expertise to interpret the factsf make findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and enter judgment thereon. 
Even if a reviewing court, such as this court, believes 
it would have decided the case differently based on this same 
evidence, that is not a basis for reversal, Beehive Medical 
Electronics v. Industrial Commission, supra. 
A recent United States Supreme Court case is directly 
analogous to this issue of the standard of review by an appellate 
court. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C.. 470 U.S. , 
105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L. Ed.2d 518 (1985), was an appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court from a decision of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversing a district court finding in a sex-
discrimination case. The Supreme Court reversed the court of 
appeals, holding that the court of appeals should not subject the 
district court findings to more stringent review merely because 
the Court's findings were initially drafted by the prevailing 
party and also holding that the court of appeals improperly 
applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. This "clearly erroneous11 
language is not found in Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, but it is analogous to the rule applied by this court 
in appeals from a district court trial de novo of a 
discrimination matter. The case arose out of the hiring of a 24-
year old male with a college degree in physical education instead 
of a 39-year-old female school teacher with college degrees in 
social studies and education, for a job managing a city's 
recreational facilities and program. The district court based 
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part of its findings on documentary evidence, such as resumes, 
and found against the city* The court of appeals disagreed with 
the district court's findings and reversed finding in favor of 
the city. In reversing the court of appeals the United States 
Supreme Court defined and described the clearly erroneous 
standard. 
... A finding is "clearly erroneous" when 
although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been committed.... (Citation omitted). 
This standard plainly does not entitle a 
reviewing court to reverse the finding of the 
trier of fact simply because it is convinced that 
it would have decided the case differently. The 
reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty 
under Rule 52 if it undertakes to duplicate the 
role of the lower court. In applying the clearly 
erroneous "standard" to the findings of a district 
court sitting without a jury, appellate courts 
must constantly have in mind that their function 
is not to decide factual issues de novo.... 
(Citation omitted). 
If the district court's account of the evidence 
is plausible in light of the record viewed in its 
entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it 
even though convinced that had it been sitting as 
the trier of fact, it would have weighed the 
evidence differently. Where there are two 
permissible views of the evidence, the fact 
finder's choice between them cannot be clearly 
erroneous. [Citations omitted] 
The court went on to say that this rule applies even 
when the district court's findings are based on physical or 
documentary evidence which might also be equally available to a 
reviewing court because the district court role, experience, and 
expertise is to make those determinations, not the appellate 
court. 
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This is so even when the district court's 
findings do not rest on credibility 
determinations, but are based instead on physical 
or documentary evidence or inferences from other 
facts.••. 
The rational for deference to the original 
finder of fact is not limited to the superiority 
of the trial judge's position to make 
determinations of credibility. The trial judge's 
major role is the determination of factf and with 
experience in fulfilling that role comes 
expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's 
efforts in the court of appeals would very likely 
contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact 
determination at the huge cost of diversion of 
judicial resources. 
Id. 105 S.Ct. at 1512-1513. 
For the purposes of applying this reasoning to this 
case the definitions of "clearly erroneous" and "clearly 
preponderates against the evidence" are indistinguishable. 
As in the Anderson vt Bessemer City case, supra, the 
district court in this matter had before it documentary evidence 
and also had the opportunity to see and receive direct testimony 
from the three primary witnesses (McQuown, Esplin and Gregoire) 
to consider their demeanor and credibility. After announcing its 
decision the court carefully considered the proposed findings of 
fact drafted by the prevailing party and for the most part 
adopted the recommendations of McQuown's attorney relative to 
amending those proposed findings. (R. 982, lines 23-25; 983f 
lines 1-5) . 
The facts as set forth in the Statement of Facts, as 
supported by the findings of fact contained in Appendix 2f 
proposed findings of fact set forth in Appendix 3 and the 
underlying record itself abundantly support the finding of the 
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district court that the employment decisions complained about by 
McQuown were motivated by her failure to perform assigned duties 
and insubordination to her supervisor or other legitimate, work-
related circumstances, needs, skills or abilities and were 
unrelated to her sex, age or her engaging in protected activity. 
In fact, the University submits that not only does the 
evidence at least support the findings of the district court for 
purposes of review by this court but, in fact, when read fairly 
and in its entirety, the record does not and would not support 
the findings of fact, conclusions of law and recommendations 
issued by the hearing examiner as adopted by the Industrial 
Commission. Practically, every inference relative to a disputed 
fact was resolved by the hearing examiner in favor of McQuown, 
perhaps because he applied an improper burden of proof on KUED 
rather than the burden of producing evidence (see page 31 of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Edward T. Wells, 
August 8, 1983, referred to in R. 60; R. 939-940). This is 
contrary to the established burdens of proof as outlined for such 
cases by the United States Supreme Court in the case of H&&&S. 
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 
S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (see Point IV). The district 
judge said he could not even find in favor of McQuown even if he 
shifted the proper burden of proof in her favor by interpreting 
the evidence in the light most favorable to her. The court 
stated: 
I don't think that the reasons they've given, 
even believing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Mrs. McQuown, would indicate that 
their reasons for terminating her were 
discrimination based on sex or age. 
TR. Feb. 13, 1985, page 63 lines 5-8; R. 970 lines 2-8.. 
This reflects a determination by the court that 
regardless of the inferences that could be drawn from disputed 
facts throughout the record, he would not have found in favor of 
McQuown. This amounts to a finding by the district court that 
the findings of the hearing examiner and Industrial Commission 
clearly preponderated against the weight of the evidence. 
Therefore, even if the district court were sitting as an 
intermediate appellate court rather than a de novo trial court, 
as erroneously argued by McQuown, the district court would have 
found the Industrial Commission determination clearly erroneous. 
Nevertheless, the district court was not reviewing the 
record as an appellate court but as a trier of facts de novo and 
there is abundant evidence to support that determination. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED THE PROPER 
ANALYSIS AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN ANALYZING THE 
FACTS. 
McQuown asserts that the district court imposed an 
improper burden of proof (see point III, Brief of Appellant), and 
represents that in a case alleging disparate treatment against an 
individual there is no requirement of "discriminatory intent" and 
that proof of discriminatory motive is only required in a case 
alleging disparate impact of a facially neutral policy. This 
misstatement is an absolute reversal of the correct principles of 
law. 
The leading case dealing with the nature and burdens of 
proof in a case alleging discriminatory treatment of an 
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individual is the case of Texas Department of Community Affairs 
v. Burdine. supra. This is the case cited to and relied upon by 
the district judge. It involved alleged discriminatory treatment 
of a woman who applied for a directorship within her agency but 
the position was left open for some time after her application 
and finally filled by a male applicant. The complainant was 
subsequently terminated in a reduction of staff. The district 
court had found in favor of the Texas Department of Community 
Affairs, finding no discrimination. The Fifth Circuit reversed, 
holding that the defendant had the burden of proving legitimate 
non-discriminatory motivation regarding the termination. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit holding 
the defendant never has the burden of proof, but only the burden 
of articulating a non-discriminatory basis (burden of going 
forward with evidence): 
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
by the preponderance of the evidence, a prima 
facie case of discrimination. Second, if the 
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection. Third, 
should the defendant carry this burden, the 
plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were 
not its true reasons, but were a pretext for 
discrimination. 
(Id. at 253). 
The court went on to declare the ultimate burden of 
persuasion as follows: 
The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of 
fact that the defendant intentionally 
discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all 
times with the plaintiff. 
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Id 450 U.S. at 253 (emphasis added). 
The court was careful to distinguish between this case 
which was one alleging direct "discriminatory treatment" of an 
individual employee and cases of "discriminatory impact" of 
facially neutral policies which are alleged to have 
discriminatory impact. See note 5f 450 U.S. at 252. 
The case of Aikens v. United States Postal Service, 642 
F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1980) cited by McQuown does not stand for the 
proposition that discriminatory intent is irrelevant in disparate 
treatment cases. That case involved an allegation of 
discrimination by a black postal employee but the district court 
dismissed the case summarily because it found the plaintiff had 
failed to sustain the initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case. It is true that it is not difficult to establish a 
prima facie case, which, essentially, only requires proof of 
"circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful 
discrimination". Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine. supra, 450 U.S. at 254. It's function is to eliminate 
the most common non-discriminatory reasons for employers actions. 
Id. Such a case dealing with the summary dismissal of a 
complaint for failing to establish even a prima facie case of 
discrimination is not applicable to the ultimate burden in a 
disparate treatment case which does involve the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer 
intentionally discriminated. This is the essence of the district 
court's determination that the actions were not motivated by age, 
sex, or retaliation. As Judge Daniels stated: 
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All I found, they weren' t motivated by factors 
such as age, sex, unlawful d iscr iminat ion . 
R. 983, l i n e s 1-2. 
Similarly, the case cited by McQuown of Muller v. 
United States Steel Corporation, 509 F.2d 923 (10th Circuit, 
1975) does not stand for the proposition that specific intent is 
not an element of a disparate treatment case. That case involved 
a Spanish American who, based on statistical showings, 
established that a facially neutral promotion policy resulted in 
disparate impact on Spanish Americans, including himself. 
Finally, it should be noted that McQuown failed to 
raise this issue in the court below. See Point II. 
As is evidenced by the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law dated April 11, 1985 R 88-99, (see Appendix 2) the 
district court followed meticulously the order and burden of 
proof established in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 
Burdine, supra,. 
POINT V. 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, ANY ERROR WAS 
COMMITTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT, THE PROPER 
REMEDY WOULD BE REMAND TO THE DISTRICT COURT 
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. 
As is established by the Beehive Medical Electronics v. 
Industrial Commission, supra, and Salt Lake City Corporation v. 
ConferP supra, this is an equitable proceeding with the entire 
record before the court for it's review. However, the more 
proper remedy appears to be a remand to the district court for 
further proceedings as was done in the case of Salt Lake City 
Corporation v. Confer consistent with the general principles of 
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judicial economy. As the supreme court said in Anderson v. City 
of Bessemer City, N.C., supra: 
Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in the 
court of appeals would very likely contribute only 
negligibly to the accuracy of fact determinations 
at a huge cost of diversion of judicial resources. 
Therefore, even if there had been any error in the 
district court's findings or judgment in this case the 
established, preferred and customary result should be a remand to 
that court for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's judgment on a trial de novo 
involving allegations of discrimination under Utah's Anti-
Discrimination Act supersedes any determination by the Industrial 
Commission and the district court findings are given deference on 
appeal unless clearly preponderating against the evidence. There 
is substantial evidence to support the district court's judgment 
and the court applied the proper analysis and burdens of proof in 
reaching its decision. Therefore, the findings, conclusions and 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of October, 1985. 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent 
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APPENDIX 1 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT 34-35-2 
Hirtoxy: O. 1953, S4-S4-17, enacted by 51B C.J.S Labor Kelations § 1003b. 
L. 1969, en- 85, § 159. 48 Am. Jur. 2d 66, Labor and Labor 
^ „ * , . * Belationa § 21. 
Collateral Bef erences. 
Labor Belationse=»1051, 1052. 
CHAPTER 35 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION ACT 
Section 84-35-1. Short title. 
34-35-2. Definitions. 
34-35-3. Jurisdiction of industrial commission—Creation of antidiscrimination 
division—Coordinator of fair employment practices. 
84-35-4. Antidiscrimination division—Members—Meetings—Quorum. 
34-35-5. Antidiscrimination division—Powers and duties. 
84-35-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment practices—Permitted practices. 
34-35-7. Violations—Complaints—Procedure. 
34-35-8. Judicial review—Procedure. 
S4-35-1. Short title.—This shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act." 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-1, enacted by ditions. Kopp v. Salt Lake Citv, 29 U. 
L. 1969, clL 85, § 160. (2d) 170, 506 P. 2d 809. 
Cross-Reference. Collateral Kef erences. 
Discrimination in business establish- Labor RelationsC=1471. 
ments and places of public accommodation 51B C.J.S. Labor Belations § 1256. 
prohibited, civil remedies, 13-7-1 to 13-7-4. 48 Am. Jur. 2d 69, Labor and Labor 
Purpose of Act. 
Purpose of this act is to eliminate difi-
Pelations § 22. 
Law Be views. 
crimination in the payment of wages Comment, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw— 
based solely on the basis of sex where Equal Protection and Municipal Services: 
men and women are doing the same or A Small Leap for Minorities but a Giant 
similar work under all of the aame eon- Leap for the Commentators, 1971 Utah 
L. Kev. 397. 
34-35-2. Definitions.—As used in this act: 
(1) The word "court" means the district court in and for the judicial 
district of the state of Utah in which the asserted unfair employment 
practice occurred, or if this court be not in session at that time, then any 
judge of the court. 
(2) The word "person" means one or more individuals, partnerships, 
associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, the 
state of Utah and all political subdivisions and agencies thereof. 
(3) The words "employment agency" mean any person undertaking 
to procure employees or opportunities to work for any other person, or 
tl:e holding itself out to be equipped to do so. 
(4) The words "labor organization" mean any organization which 
*x'Ms for the purpose in whole or in part of collective bargaining or of 
d-aling with employers concerning grievances, terms or conditions of em-
ployment or of other mutual aid or protection in connection with em-
pi "yment. 
(
o) The word "employer" means the state or any political subdivision 
f,r board, commission, department, institution or school district thereof, 
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and every other person employing 25 or more employees within the state; 
bnt it does not include religious organizations or associations, religious 
corporations sole, nor any corporation or association constituting a wholly 
owned subsidiary or agency of any religious organization or association or 
religious corporation sole, a bona fide private membership club (other than 
a labor organization). 
(6) The word "employee" means any person employed by an employer, 
save and except a person in the domestic service of any person. 
(7) The words "unfair employment practice" mean those practices 
specified as discriminatory or unfair in section 34-35-6. 
(8) The word "commission" means the industrial commission of the 
state of Utah, and the word "commissioner" means a member of that 
commission. 
(9) The word "co-ordinator" means the co-ordinator of fair employ-
ment practices. 
(10) The words "joint apprenticeship committee" mean any association 
of representatives of a labor organization and an employer providing, co-
ordinating, or controlling an apprentice training program. 
(11) The words "vocational school" mean any school or institution 
conducting a course of instruction, training, or retraining to prepare in-
dividuals to follow an occupation or trade, or to pursue a manual, techni-
cal, industrial, business, commercial, office, personal services, or other non-
professional occupations. 
(12) The word "apprenticeship" means any program for the training 
of apprentices including, but not limited to, any program providing the 
training of those persons defined as apprentices by section 35-8-5, whether 
or not such program is registered and approved by the apprenticeship 
council under section 35-8-2. 
(13) The words "on-the-job-training" mean any program designed to 
instruct a person who, while learning the particular job for which he is 
receiving instruction, is also employed at that job, or who may be em-
ployed by the employer conducting the program during the course of the 
program, or when the program is completed. 
History: 0. 1953, S4-35-2, enacted by L. 
1969, eh. S5, § 161. 
34-35-3. Jurisdiction of industrial commission—Creation of antidis-
crimination division—Co-ordinator of fair employment practices.—The 
commission shall have jurisdiction over the subject of employment prac-
tices and discrimination made unlawful by this chapter. There is hereby 
created a division of the commission to be known and designated as the 
Utah antidiscrimination division, which division shall be under the juris-
diction and direction of the commission. The division shall have as its 
immediate supervisory head a co-ordinator of fair employment practices. 
Such co-ordinator shall be appointed by the commission. Any co-ordinator 
so appointed shall at all times be under the direct supervision and control 
of the commission. 
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History: C. 1953, 34-35-3, enacted by Collateral References. 
L. 1969, dL R5,1162. j ^ o , Kelatioii6<£=>27. 
51 CJ.6. Labor Relations § 16. 
Orosa-B«ference.
 4 8 A m . j u r . 2d 727, Labor and Labor 
Induitrial commiaiion, 35-1-1. Relations § 1156. 
84-35-4 Antidiscrimination division—Members—Meetings—Quorum.— 
The antidiscrimination division shall consist of three members who shall be 
members of the commission. The commission may adopt, amend or rescind 
rules for governing its meetings, and two commissioners shall constitute a 
quorum. 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-4, taacted by L. 
1969, cfc. S5, |163. 
84-35-5. Antidiscrimination division—Powers and duties.—The Utah 
antidiscrimination division shall have the following powers and duties: 
(1) To appoint such investigators and other employees and agents as 
it may deem necessary for the enforcement of this chapter and to prescribe 
their duties. 
(2) To adopt, publish, amend and rescind regulations consistent with 
and for the enforcement of this chapter. 
(3) To receive, reject, investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging 
discrimination in employment, apprenticeship programs, on-the-job-train-
ing programs, or vocational schools, or the existence of a discriminatory or 
unfair employment practice by a person, an employer, an employment 
agency, a labor organization, or the employees or members thereof, a joint 
apprenticeship committee, or vocational school. 
(4) To investigate and study the existence, character causes, and ex-
tent of discrimination in employment, in apprenticeship programs, on-the-
job-training programs, or vocational schools in this state by employers, 
employment agencies and labor organizations, joint apprenticeship com-
mittees, or vocational schools, and to formulate plans for the elimination 
thereof by educational or other means. 
(5) To hold hearings upon complaint made against a person, an em-
ployer, an employment agency, a labor organization or the employees or 
members thereof, joint apprenticeship committee, or vocational school; to 
subpoena witnesses and compel their attendance; to administer oaths and 
take the testimony of any person under oath; and to compel such employer, 
employment agency, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or 
vocational school, official or other person to produce for examination any 
books and papers relating to any matter involved in such complaint. Such 
hearings may be held by the commission itself, or by any commissioner, or 
by the co-ordinator, or by any hearing examiner appointed by the commis-
sion. If a witness either fails or refuses to obey a subpoena issued by the 
commission, the commission may petition the district court having juris-
diction for issuance of a subpoena in the premises and the court shall issue 
its subpoena; and refusal to obey such subpoena shall be punishable by 
contempt. No person shall be excused from attending or testifying or from 
producing records, correspondence, documents or other evidence in obedi-
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ence to a subpoena in any such matter, on the ground that the evidence or 
the testimony required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him 
to any penalty or forfeiture; but no person shall be prosecuted or sub-
jected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, 
matter or thing concerning which he shall be compelled to testify or 
produce evidence after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, except that such person so testifying shall not be exempted from 
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. 
(6) To issue such publications and reports of investigations and re-
search as in its judgment will tend to promote good will among the various 
racial, religious and ethnical groups of the state and which will tend to 
minimize or eliminate discrimination in emplo}'ment because of race, color, 
sex, religion, ancestry or national origin. 
(7) To prepare and transmit to the governor from time to time, but 
not less often than once each year, reports describing its proceedings, in-
vestigations, hearings it has conducted and the outcome thereof, decisions 
it has rendered, and the other work performed by it. 
(8) To recommend policies to the governor and to submit recom-
mendation to employers, employment agencies and labor organizations to 
effectuate such policies. 
(9) To make recommendations to the governor for such further legis-
lation concerning discrimination because of race, creed, color, national 
origin or ancestry as it may deem necessary and desirable. 
(10) To co-operate, within the limits of any appropriations made for 
its operation, with other agencies or organizations, both public and private, 
those purposes which are consistent with those of this chapter, in the plan-
ning and conducting of educational programs designed to eliminate racial, 
religious, cultural and intergroup tensions. 
(11) To adopt an official seal. 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-5, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 85, § 164. 
S4-S5-6. Discriminatory or unfair employment practices—Permitted 
practices.—(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice : 
(a) For an employer to refuse to hire, to discharge, to promote or 
demote, or to discriminate in matters of compensation against any person 
otherwise qualified, because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry or na-
tional origin. No applicant nor candidate for any job or position shall 
be deemed "otherwise qualified'' unless he or she possesses the education, 
training, ability, moral character, integrity, disposition to work, adherence 
to reasonable rules and regulations, and other qualifications required by 
an employer for any particular job, job classification or position to be filled 
or created. 
As used in this chapter, "To discriminate in matters of compensation'' 
means the payment of differing wages or salaries to employees having sub-
stantially equal experience, responsibilities, and competency for the par-
ticular job. However, nothing in this chapter shall prevent increases in pay 
as a result of longevity with the employer, if the salary increases are 
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uniformly applied and available to all employees on a substantially pro-
portional basis. 
(b) For an employment agency to refuse to list and properly classify 
for employment or to refer an individual for employment in a known avail-
able job for which such individual is otherwise qualified, because of race, 
color, sex, religion, ancestry or national origin, or to comply with a request 
from an employer for referral of applicants for employment if the request 
indicates either directly or indirectly that the employer discriminates in 
employment on account of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry or national 
origin. 
(c) For a labor organization to exclude any individual otherwise 
qualified from full membership rights in such labor oganization, or to 
expel such individual from membership in such labor organization, or to 
otherwise discriminate against any of its members in the full employment 
of work opportunity, because of race, creed, sex, religion, ancestry or na-
tional origin. 
(d) For any employer, employment agency or labor organization to 
print or circulate or cause to be printed or circulated any statement, 
advertisement or publication, or to use any form of application for 
employment or membership, or to make any inquiry in connection witli 
prospective employment or membership which expresses, either directly or 
indirectly, any limitation, specification, or discrimination as to race, color, 
sex, ancestry or national origin or intent to make any such limitation, 
specification or discrimination; unless based upon a bona fide occupational 
qualification, or is required by and given to an agency of government for 
security reasons. 
(e) For any person, whether or not an employer, an employment 
agency, a labor organization, or the employees or members thereof to aid, 
abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of an act defined in this section to 
be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice or to obstruct or prevent 
any person from complying with the provisions of this chapter or any 
order issued thereunder; or to attempt, either directly or indirectly, to 
commit any act defined in this section to be a discriminatory or unfair 
employment practice. 
(f) For any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship com-
mittee, or vocational school, providing, co-ordinating, or controlling ap-
prenticeship programs, or providing, co-ordinating, or controlling on-tbe-
job-training programs, or other instruction, training or retraining programs: 
1. To deny to or withhold from any qualified person because of his 
race, color, sex, religion, ancestry or national origin the right to be 
admitted to or participate in any apprenticeship training program, on-the-
job-training program, or other occupational instruction, training or re-
training program. 
2. To discriminate against any qualified person in his pursuit of such 
programs or to discriminate against such a person in the terms, conditions 
or privileges of such programs because of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry 
or national origin. 
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8. To print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or 
advertisement relating to employment by such employer or membership 
in or any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organi-
sation, or relating to any classification or referral for employment by such 
employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation, specification or 
discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, ancestry or national 
origin except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a prefer-
ence, Lmitation, specification or discrimination based on religion, sex, or 
national origin when religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification for employment. 
(2) It shall not be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice : 
(a) For an employer to hire and employ employees, for an employment 
agency to classify or refer for employment any individual, for a labor 
organisation to classify its membership or to classify or refer for employ-
ment any individual or for an employer, labor organization, or joint labor-
management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or 
retraining programs to admit or employ any individual in any such pro-
gram, on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in tbo^e certain 
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise or essential to the motif, culture or atmosphere dis-
played, illustrated or promoted by such particular business or enterprise. 
(b) For a school, college, university or other educational institution or 
institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion 
if such achool, college, university, or other educational institution or in-
stitution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, 
controlled or managed by a particular religious corporation, association or 
society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university or other 
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the 
propagation of a particular religion. 
(c) For an employer to give preference in employment to his or her 
own spouse, son, son-in-law, daughter, daughter-in-law, or to any person 
for whom the employer is or would be liable to furnish financial support 
if such persons were unemployed; or for an employer to give preference 
in employment to any person to whom the employer during the preceding 
six months has furnished more than one-half of total financial support 
regardless of whether or not the employer was or is legally obligated to 
furnish such support; or for an employer to give preference in employ-
ment to any person whose education or training was substantially financed 
by such employer for a period of two years or more. 
(d) Nothing contained in this chapter shall apply to any business or 
enterprise on or near an Indian reservation with respect to any publicly 
announced employment practice of such business or enterprise under 
which preferential treatment is given to any individual because he or she 
is an Indian living on or near an Indian reservation. 
(e) Nothing contained in this chapter shall be interpreted to require 
any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-
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management committee anbject to this chapter to grant preferential treat-
ment to any individnal or to any group because of the race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin of such individual or group on account of an im-
balance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of 
persons of any race, color, religion, sex or national origin employed by any 
employer, referred or classified for employment by an employment agency 
or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor 
organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other 
training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of 
persons of such race, color, religion, sex or national origin in any commu-
nity or county or in the available work force in any community or county. 
History: C. 1963, 34-35-6, tnacted by the received less pay than a regular po-
L. 1969, ch. 85, §165; L. 1971, en. 73, §10; liceman doing the same work was not 
1973, clL 65, § 1. entitled to relief in view of the more 
stringent qualifications and training re-
Compiler's Notes. quired of police officers and the varied na-
The 1971 amendment inserted "religion" ture of their duties. Kopp v. Bait Lake 
in the first sentence in subd. ( l ) (a) . City, 29 U. (2d) 170, 506 P. 2d 809. 
The 1973 amendment added the second
 m _ m 
paragraph to subd. (1) (a). Collateral References. 
Labor KelationsC=>884. 885. 
Repealing Clause.
 5 1 B C.J.S. Labor Relations § 866. 
Section 11 of Laws 1971, eh. 73 pro- 48 Am. Jur. 2d 69, Labor and Labor Re-
vided: "Sections 34-21-1, 34-30-10, 34 31- lations § 22. 
1, 34-31-2, 34-31-3, and 34-31-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by chapter 85, Discharge from private employment on 
Laws of Utah 1969, are repealed." ground of political views or conduct, 51 
^ _ ,
 J J „ A. L. R. 2d 742. 
Discrimination in rate of pay. Discharge of employee as reprisal or 
Discrimination in rate of pay cannot be retaliation for union organizational ac-
determined solely on whether a person tivities, 83 A. L. R. 2d 535. 
is doing the same work with the same Termination of employment because of 
degree of competence as other employees; pregnancy as affecting right to unemploy-
classifieetion, seniority and degree of re- ment compensation, 51 A. L. R. 3d 254. 
sponsibility employee is required to as-
sume must also be considered: police dis- Law ReTiews. 
patcher who claimed she had been dis- Sex as a Bona Fide Occupational Quali-
eriminated against on basis of sex in that fication, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 395. 
S4-35-7. Violations—Complaints—Procedure.—(1) Any person claim-
ing to be aggravated by a discriminatory or alleged unfair employment 
practice may, by himself or his attorney at law, make, sign, and file with 
the commission a written complaint in duplicate, on form to be furnished 
by the commission, which shall state the name and address of the person, 
employer, employment agency, or labor organization, joint apprenticeship 
committee, or vocational school alleged to have committed the discrimina-
tory or unfair employment practice complained of and which shall set 
forth the particulars thereof and contain such other information as may be 
required by the commission. Every complaint shall be verified under oath 
and shall clearly show that the person denied employment by an unfair 
employment practice is fully qualified for the position or job applied for, 
or in case of dismissal, that there was no just cause within the meaning of 
this chapter for dismissal. 
(2) Any employer, or labor organization, joint apprenticeship com-
mittee, or vocational school whose employees or members, or some of them, 
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refuse or threaten to refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter 
may file with the commission a written complaint in duplicate asking the 
commission for assistance to obtain their compliance by conciliation or 
other remedial action. 
(3) After the filing of a complaint, the co-ordinator shall make, with 
the assistance of the staff, a prompt impartial investigation thereof, and if 
•uch investigating official shall detennine that probable cause exists for 
crediting the allegations of the complaint he shall immediately endeavor 
to eliminate such discriminatory or unfair employment practice by con-
ference, conciliation and persuasion. In the event investigation discloses 
that the applicant was not qualified or the dismissed employee was dis-
charged for reasonable or just cause, the complaint shall be dismissed, and 
the parties affected so notified. 
(4) Any person against whom a complaint is filed shall be notified 
of such filing by the commission within five days after such filing. The 
members of the commission and its staff shall not disclose the information 
gathered during the investigation or the endeavors to eliminate such dis-
criminatory or unfair employment practice by conference, conciliation and 
persuasion, except to the party charged, unless such disclosure is made in 
connection with the conduct of such. The commission and its staff and 
agents and employees shall conduct every investigation in all fairness to 
the employer, to the complaining party, and to all parties and agencies 
involved, and in those instances where the applicant is not fully qualified 
for the job sought, and, in those instances where the person was dismissed 
for reasons within the meaning of this chapter, the commission and its staff 
and agents and employees shall make no effort to induce the employer to 
hire the unqualified applicant nor to re-employ the justly discharged former 
employee. 
(5) In case of failure to satisfactorily settle a complaint by confer-
ence, conciliation and persuasion, or in advance thereof if in the opinion of 
the investigating official circumstances so warrant, he may issue and cause 
to be served, a written notice, together with a copy of such complaint as 
the same may have been amended, requiring the person, employer, employ-
ment agency, labor organisation, joint apprenticeship committee, or voca-
tional school named in such complaint (hereinafter referred to as re-
spondent) to answer the charges of such complaint in writing within ten 
days after the date of such notice or within such extended time as the in-
vestigating official may allow. 
(6) When the investigating official is satisfied that further endeavors 
to settle a complaint by conference, conciliation and persuasion will be 
futile, he shall report the same to the commission. If the commission deter-
mines that the circumstances warrant, it shall issue and cause to be served 
a written notice requiring the respondent to answer the charges of such 
complaint at a hearing before the commission, a commissioner or com-
missioners, or nther person designated by the commission to conduct the 
bearing (hereinafter referred to as hearing examiner) and at a time and 
place to be ipecifie 1 in such notice. 
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(7) The case in support of such complaint shall be presented at the 
hearing by one of the commission's attorneys or agents. The investigating 
official shall not participate in the hearing except as a witness nor shall he 
participate in the deliberations of the commission in such case. 
(8) The respondent may file a written answer to the complaint and 
appear at the hearing in person, or otherwise, with or without counsel and 
submit testimony. In the discretion of the hearing examiner, a complainant 
may be allowed to intervene and present testimony in person or by 
counsel. 
(9) When a respondent has failed to answer a complaint at a hearing 
as herein provided, the commission may enter his default. For good cause 
shown, the commission may set aside an entry of default within ten days 
after the date of such entry. In the event the respondent is in default, the 
commission may proceed to hear testimony adduced upon behalf of the 
complainant. After hearing such testimony, the commission may enter 
such order as in its opinion the evidence warrants. 
(10) The commission or the complainant shall have the power to rea-
sonably atfd fairly amend any complaint, and the respondent shall have 
like power to amend his answer. 
(11) The commission shall be bound by the rules of evidence prevail-
ing in courts of law or equity, and the right of cross-examination shall be 
preserved. The testimony taken at a hearing shall be under oath and shall 
be transcribed by a certified shorthand reporter. 
(12) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the commission shall find 
that a respondent has engaged in or is engaging in, any discriminatory or 
unfair employment practice as defined in this chapter, the commission shall 
state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served upon such 
respondent an order requiring such respondent to cease and desist from 
such discriminatory or unfair employment practice and to take such affirma-
tive action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement, or up-
grading of employees, with or without back-pay, the referring of applicants 
for employment by any respondent employment agency, the restoration to 
membership by any respondent labor organization, the admission to or 
continuation in enrollment in an apprenticeship program, on-tbe-job-train-
iug program, or a vocational school, the posting of notices, and the making 
of reports as to the manner of compliance, as in the judgment of the 
commission will effectuate the purposes of this chapter. 
(13) If, upon all of the evidence at a hearing, the commission shall 
find that a respondent has not engaged in any such discriminatory or 
unfair employment practice, the commission shall state its findings of fact 
and shall issue and cause to be served an order on the complainant dis-
missing the complaint in which event the respondent may be reimbursed 
his costs at the discretion of the commission. 
(14) The commission shall establish rules to govern, expedite and effec-
tuate the foregoing procedures and its own actions subject to the conditions 
and provisions of this chapter. 
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(15) Any complaint filed pursuant to this chapter must be so filed with-
in thirty days after the alleged discriminatory or unfair employment prac-
tice occurred. 
History: C. 1053, 34-S5-7, enacted by I*, paying back wagee in subsec. (12) ii di§-
1969, ciL 85, §165 [166]. cretionary, doctrines of equity should be 
given some consideration in fashioning 
Discrimination to rate of pay. the proper reraedv. Kopp v. Bait Lake 
Discrimination in rate of pay cannot be City, 29 U. (2d) 170, 506 P. 2d 809. 
determined solely on whether a person is 
doing the same wo>k with the same degree Tnirty-day requirement. 
of competence as other employees; classi- "Where complainant made proper oral 
fication, seniority and degree of responBi- complaint under subhec. (1) of this »ec-
bility employee is required to assume must tion four days after improper discharge, 
also be considered; police dispatcher who and where a form pursuant to subsec. (1) 
claimed she had been discriminated is not made available to her until more 
against on basis of sex in that she re- than thirty days after her initial com-
ceived less pay than a regular policeman plaint, complainant is under no duty to 
doing the same work was not entitled to file within thirty days. Tidwell v. Ameri-
relief in view of the more stringent quali- can Oil Co., 332 F. 6upp. 424. 
fications and training required of police 
officers and the varied nature of their du- Collateral Eeferences. 
ties. Kopp v. Salt Lake City, 29 U. (2d) Civil Right§C=>2. 3. 
170, 506 P. 2d 809. 14 CJ.S. Civil Bights § 3. 
48 Am. Jur. 2d 69, Labor and Labor Bo-
Imposition of penalty. lations § 22. 
Bince the imposition of the penalty of 
DECISIONS UKDEB FOBMEB LAW 
Oral complaint neither required a writing nor prohiHted 
"May" under former provision similar an oral complaint. Tidwell v. American 
to subsec. (1) authorized an aggrie\cd Oil Co., 332 F. Supp. 424. 
employee to file a written complaint but 
34-35-8. Judicial review—Procedure.—(1) Any complainant, or re-
ipondent claiming to be aggrieved by a final order of the commission, in-
cluding a refusal to issue an order, may obtain judicial review thereof and 
the commission may obtain an order of court for its enforcement in a pro-
ceeding as provided in this section. 
(2) Such proceeding shall be brought in the district court of the 
district in which is located the county in which the alleged discrimina-
tory or unfair employment practice which is the subject of the com-
mission's order was committed, or in which any respondent required in the 
order to cease or desist from a discriminatory or unfair employment prac-
tice, or to take other affirmative action, resides or transacts business. 
(3) Such judicial review sought by the person or persons claiming to 
be aggrieved by a final order of the commission shall be initiated by filing 
in the district court not later than one month after actual service of a 
copy of the order of the commission on such aggrieved party or parties, 
a petition for a trial de novo in the district court. Within five days after 
the filing of such petition in the district court, the petitioner shall cause to 
be served upon the commission and upon all persons who appeared as ad-
verse parties at any hearing or proceeding before the commission a copy of 
•uch petition for trial de novo in the district court. In the event the 
addresses of all adverse parties cannot be ascertained by the petition, the 
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petitioner shall serve such copies upon such parties in care of the commis-
sion. 
(4) The filing of such petition in the district court shall operate as a 
6tay of enforcement of the order of the commission until or unless the 
district court shall dismiss such petition or enter a judgment upon a trial 
de novo in the district court. 
(5) Such petition for a trial de novo shall specify the date of the 
order and the parties to the proceeding before the commission. Within 
fifteen days after filing such petition the commission shall file in the district 
court where such petition has been filed the entire case file before the com-
mission containing the formal complaint, the answer and all other docu-
ments and exhibits, together with a transcript of the hearing before the 
commission if any of the parties so require. The district court upon 
motion of any party to the proceeding in the district court shall have the 
authority to order the appearance of new parties and to require any of the 
parties to file new pleadings or allow any amendment to pleadings, or to 
expedite discovery proceedings. 
(6) Upon the conclusion of a trial de novo in the district court or 
other proceedings which appropriately dispose of all issues of fact and of 
law, the district court shall enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment and decree, which shall be subject to enforcement upon the 
application of the commission or any party to the judgment. The parties 
may waive findings of fact and conclusions of law. The judgment entered 
in the district court shall supersede any order made by the commission. 
(7) The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive, and its judgment 
and order shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme Court as pro-
vided by law. 
(8) The commission's copy of the testimony shall be available to all 
parties for examination at all reasonable times, without cost, and for the 
purpose of judicial review of the commission's orders. 
(9) The commission may appear in court by its own attorney. 
(10) Proceedings in the district court shall be expedited at all stages 
to final judgment as far as consistent with justice to all interested parties. 
(11) If no proceeding to obtain judicial review is instituted by a com-
plainant or respondent within one month from the service of an order of 
the commission pursuant to section 34-35-7, the commission may obtain a 
decree of the court for the enforcement of such order upon showing that 
respondent is subject to the jurisdiction of the commission and resides or 
transacts business within the county in which the petition for enforcement 
is brought. 
(12) The provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, so far as 
applicable, and not in conflict with this chapter, apply to proceedings in 
the court* under the provisions of this chapter. 
History: C. 1053, 34-35-8, enacted by L. day or holiday in computing time for tak-
1969, ch. 85, §167. inj: or pcrfectinp appeal from a labor nd-
_ ministrative agency, 61 A. L. R. 2d 48-J. 
CoU at era] References, 
Exclusion or inclusion of terminal Sun 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
- v -
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
AND PAULA MCQUOWN, 
R e s p o n d e n t s . 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
C i v i l No. C-83-6966 
(Judge D a n i e l s ) 
On Wednesday, F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1 9 8 5 , t h e above m a t t e r came 
on f o r h e a r i n g on P e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n f o r a t r i a l de novo 
p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code Ann. § 3 4 - 3 5 - 8 (1953 a s amended) from an 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n D i v i s i o n r u l i n g a d v e r s e 
t o p e t i t i o n e r and f a v o r a b l e t o t h e r e s p o n d e n t s . A s s i s t a n t 
A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l W i l l i a m T. Evans a p p e a r e d i n b e h a l f of t h e 
p e t i t i o n e r , and David E. L e t a , of Hansen , J o n e s , Maycock and 
L e t a , a p p e a r e d on b e h a l f of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s . The C o u r t had 
p r e v i o u s l y r e v i e w e d t h e e n t i r e r e c o r d from t h e I n d u s t r i a l 
Commission a s s t i p u l a t e d t o by t h e p a r t i e s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission r e c o r d t h e C o u r t h e a r d b r i e f sworn 
t e s t i m o n y from P a u l a McQuown, r e s p o n d e n t , and Fred E s p l i n and 
Jeannine Gregoire, representatives of petitioner. Counsel argued 
the case and submitted it to the Court. 
The Court having reviewed the record, having observed 
and heard brief testimony from principal witnesses, and having 
heard arguments and representations from counsel, and being now 
fully advised in the premises, hereby makes the following 
findings of facts and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Charging party in the Industrial Commission and 
respondent here, Paula McQuown (hereafter Ms. McQuown), is a 
female who is and has been over 40 years of age at all times 
since October, 1980. Respondent University of Utah is and has 
been an employer within the meaning of the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e(b) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 
630(b), at all time relevant to this action. 
2. Ms. McQuown was hired in 1971 at KUED as a 
receptionist (4/19 page 62; R-42). 
3. In 1972, Ms. McQuown was assigned to the position 
of Promotion Director (4/19 page 61). 
4. During Ms. McQuown1s employment she had nine 
different supervisors including individuals that were over 40, 
under 40, male and female. During this period her supervisors 
expressed mixed opinions concerning her performance. 
5. In April, 1979, her title of Promotion Director was 
changed to Manager to Publicity and Public Relations under a 
revised structure. 
6. On April 11, 1979, a reorganization was effected 
which placed three managers under the Marketing Director, Steve 
Smith, which were Jonathan Sack, Manager of Fund Raising, Norma 
Tharp, Manager of Advertising and Promotion, and Ms. McQuown, 
Manager of Publicity and Public Relations (4/19, pages 97, 102-
104) . 
7. Fred Esplin was hired as Director of Marketing of 
KUED in September, 1979. In that position, he was Ms. McQuown1s 
immediate supervisor. 
8. In January, 1980, Fred Esplin evaluated Ms. McQuown 
(P-10). She was evaluated effective in publicity and PR roles, 
editing Fanfare and working with the press. However, she was 
evaluated as needing improvement in initiating and planning 
special events, screenings, assuming fiscal and production 
oversight for Fanfare and developing target mailings. She was 
encouraged to keep Fanfare going out one week prior to the end of 
the month, initiating and presenting three special events for the 
year and developing a plan. 
9. In March, 1980, Fred Esplin personally discussed 
with Ms. McQuown concerns he had regarding her work performance 
and on March 31, 1980, (P-ll) he wrote a memo placing Ms. McQuown 
on probation, giving her only an eight per cent raise, subject to 
subsequent evaluation. She received and signed this on April 3, 
1980. The problem areas identified included (1) use of time, (2) 
fiscal oversight of Fanfare. (3) production oversight of Fanfare. 
and (4) lack of organization and planning. Twelve specific 
assignments were listed as being required to accomplish and a 
timetable was given. She was placed on notice that on a 
subsequent evaluation, if she had not responded adequately to 
these concerns, she would be given notice of termination. Fred 
Esplin further clarified these concerns and responded to a memo 
from her regarding her evaluation, giving suggestions and 
encouragement on April 23, 19 80 (R-3). 
10. On May 5, 1980, Fred Esplin gave an interim 
evaluation indicating satisfaction of six of twelve items 
mentioned (P-13). 
11. On June 4, 1980, Fred Esplin recommended, and 
McQuown received, an increase from eight per cent to eleven per 
cent (P-16) based on her attempt to respond to the specific 
items. Eleven per cent was average for the station. Ms. McQuown 
did not complete all the assignments but was developing and 
appeared to have made an effort (5/25, page 35). 
12. In September and October, 1980, a reorganization 
of the Marketing Department was accomplished. This was done by 
Fred Esplin in consultation with Bruce Christensen and personnel 
at other public television stations. It had been under 
consideration for several months. Fred Esplin1s purpose and 
motivation were to benefit the fund raising capacity in the 
Marketing Department (5/20, page 113; 5/21, page 50) and also to 
match individual skills and abilities, including those of Ms. 
McQuown, with assignments to make them more compatible while at 
the same time creating a viable organization which would 
withstand changes in personnel (5/24, pages 56-62). 
13. The reorganization changed the organization of the 
Marketing Department area in which Ms. McQuown (Manager of 
Publicity and Public Relations) and Norma Tharp (Manager of 
Advertising/Promotion) worked by, essentially, creating a new 
level of management over those two areas (between Ms. McQuown and 
the Director of Marketing where previously there had been a 
direct supervision of Ms. McQuown by the Director of Marketing, 
Fred Esplin) (P-9, P-22). 
14. In the new reorganization, the position of 
Coordinator of Editorial Services was filled by Becky Sowards (P-
9) and the position of Coordinator of Publicity and Public 
Relations continued to be filled by Ms. McQuown. There was a 
change of name and a change in duties in that she was relieved of 
the obligations to Fanfare, which were transferred to Becky 
Sowards, (5/24, pages 60-61) and Ms. McQuown was given some minor 
liaison responsibility concerning KUER Radio (5/19, page 37). 
Ms. McQuown had expressed concern on previous occasions at the 
amount of time that the Fanfare magazine was taking from her (R-
1, 5/19, page 23). 
15. Ms. McQuown1s job continued at the same grade, 
step and pay level as determined by the University of Utah 
Personnel Department, so it was not intended as a demotion (5/21, 
page 28-29). However, it did have the effect of moving others up 
and placing an additional level of supervision between Ms. 
McQuown and the Director of Marketing, Fred Esplin (P-22). Ms. 
McQuown considered it a demotion in terms of prestige and 
responsibility (5/20, page 108-109). 
16. Ms. McQuownfs skills and abilities were considered 
in the reorganization. Fred Esplin considered her to have not 
demonstrated skills in fiscal and production management but felt 
her writing and public relations skills were beneficial (5/24f 
pages 57-62). 
17. In the reorganization the position of Manager of 
Advertising and Public Information was advertised and both 
Jeannine Diane Gregoire and Ms. McQuown, along with others, 
applied for that position. Based on his knowledge of the 
applicants, review of their application materials, and 
conversations with some of their prior supervisors Fred Esplin 
selected Ms. Gregoire and Ms. McQuown was so notified on 
October 26, 19 80. 
18. During October and November, 1980, Fred Esplin 
became concerned about Ms. McQuown1s performance and on November 
25, 1980, he notified her of his specific concerns, including 
failure to meet several deadlines, and the fact that another 
similar instance would be grounds for termination. 
19. On November 26, 1980, Ms. McQuown filed a charge 
of discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and 
EEOC alleging sex and age discrimination, in the failure to 
select Ms. McQuown for the position of Manager of Advertising and 
Public Information, and in the threat of termination on the 
previous day, November 25, 1980, and in the reorganization which 
resulted in an alleged demotion. 
20. On or about December 1, 1980, Jeannine Gregoire 
began functioning as Manager in Advertising and Public 
Information and Ms. McQuown1s supervisor. Almost from the outset 
Ms. McQuown and Ms. Gregoire did not get along. 
21. In January, 1981, Fred Esplin evaluated Ms. 
McQuown's performance as "marginal" (P-23). Even though Jeannine 
Gregoire was her supervisor, he evaluated her, noting as areas 
for improvement the meeting of deadlines, initiation of special 
events, better planning and goal setting and more careful 
attention to policies ("requisitions, etc."). Fred Esplin 
evaluated her because he was familiar with her previous year's 
performance and Jeannine Gregoire had not yet had sufficient 
experience supervising Ms. McQuown to give her a well-founded 
appraisal (5/24, page 85). Fred Esplin informed Ms. McQuown that 
because of her being placed on probation, because of her marginal 
rating and because a new supervisor would want to evaluate her 
soon anyway, she would have another evaluation later in the year 
(5/24, pages 84-85). The University policy regarding employee 
evaluations is that they should be done at lease once a year but 
nothing precludes additional evaluations during the year, 
particularly when an employee is placed on probation or other 
extenuating circumstances are involved. 
22. In the opinion of her supervisors during the 
winter and spring of 1981 Ms. McQuown did not fulfill several 
assignments and appeared unresponsive and insubordinate. 
23. On June 5, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire performed an 
evaluation on Ms. McQuown (R-24) in which she was graded 
"marginal" and, in effect, placed on probation. In attempting to 
locate Ms. McQuown in order to discuss such evaluation, it was 
Jeannine Gregoire1s perception that Paula McQuown avoided her. 
Ms. McQuown testified of the events of this time in not being 
able to make contact w^; " tannine Gregoire as involving an 
extremely busy wo is well as being sick. Jeannine 
Gregoire had reacned the point that she did not trust Ms. McQuown 
and perceived the allegation of being sick as well as suggestion 
that she was too busy as excuses which were not justifiable but 
only attempts to avoid meeting. 
24. On June 26, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire wrote a 
memorandum to Paula McQuown indicating that she would be 
suspended for one day for the perceived insubordination relative 
to the failure to meet with her supervisor prior to leaving. She 
was placed on probation (R-26). She requested that Ms. McQuown 
meet immediately with her supervisor on her return to KUED after 
vacation. 
25. On June 30, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire wrote to Ms. 
McQuown placing her on probation (R-27) and reminding her of her 
failure to discuss this matter with her prior to leaving on 
vacation. She notified her that there was no raise forthcoming 
unless her performance improved, at which time a six per cent 
retroactive raise would be given. Ms. McQuown was reminded to 
meet with her supervisor immediately upon her reporting back to 
work (R-27) . 
26. On June 30, 1981, Ms. McQuown was to return to 
work but notified the receptionist that she could not receive a 
flight out of San Francisco. Jeannine Gregoire contacted three 
carriers operating between San Francisco and Salt Lake City and 
found that in all cases there were available seats on the 
flights. Jeannine Gregoire perceived this as evidence of a 
dishonest response from Ms. McQuown. She notified Ms. McQuown by 
memorandum that she should contact her supervisor directly rather 
than leaving word with the receptionist. However, she did not 
indicate that she had been in direct contact with any air 
carriers and did not confront her with this matter. 
27. On July 1# 1981, Ms. McQuown returned to work. In 
spite of several memoranda requesting her immediate contact of 
her supervisor, she failed to do so (R-29). 
28. On July 7, 1981, Ms. McQuown was to take her one 
day of suspension, which is a day she choose. Instead of failing 
to come into work, she showed up in the office in the morning, 
and spoke with another employee for approximately one hour and 
twenty minutes. She was told that she was on suspension and that 
it was inappropriate for her to appear in the office at which 
time she left. Jeannine Gregoire considered this another act of 
insubordination and total unresponsiveness to orders (R-30, 31). 
29. In the opinion of her supervisors Ms. McQuown 
continued to ^e unresponsive to various assignments and requests 
from them and they considered her behavior to be insubordinate. 
In their opinion Ms. McQuown failed to perform her work 
satisfactorily during her final probationary period. 
30. On December 15, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire 
recommended that based on Ms. McQuown1s failure to adequately 
perform during her probationary period she should be terminated 
(R-38). 
3 1 . On December 17 f 1981 , Jeannine Grego i re wrote 
another memorandum r e g a r d i n g Ms. McQuown's performance 
recommending t e r m i n a t i o n for f a i l u r e t o perform her job in an 
a c c e p t a b l e manner du r ing the p roba t i ona ry per iod (R-39) . 
32 . On January 12 , 1982, Ms. McQuown rece ived n o t i c e 
of t e r m i n a t i o n (P-3 0 ) . 
3 3 . Ms. McQuown was rep laced by a female . 
34. On February 8, 1982, Ms. McQuown f i l e d a charge of 
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n wi th t he Utah A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n D i v i s i o n and 
EEOC a l l e g i n g sex and age d i s c r i m i n a t i o n and i l l e g a l r e t a l i a t i o n 
r e l a t i v e t o her t e r m i n a t i o n from employment. 
35 . The mot iva t ion of Ms. McQuown's s u p e r v i s o r s for 
her t e r m i n a t i o n were her f a i l u r e s in performing her ass igned 
d u t i e s as d e s c r i b e d in her job d e s c r i p t i o n and i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n t o 
her s u p e r v i s o r . 
36 . To the e x t e n t t h e r e has been any d i f f e r e n c e in 
t r e a t m e n t , terms or c o n d i t i o n s of employment between Ms. McQuown 
and any o the r male, female or younger employees, t h e s e d i f f e r ence 
have been based on l e g i t i m a t e , w o r k - r e l a t e d c i r c u m s t a n c e s , needs , 
s k i l l s , a b i l i t i e s , and were u n r e l a t e d t o Ms. McQuown's sex , age , 
or her engaging in p r o t e c t e d a c t i v i t y . 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n over the p a r t i e s and 
s u b j e c t m a t t e r . 
2 . Un ive r s i t y of Utah i s an employer w i th in t h e 
meaning of Utah A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Act , Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-35-2(5) (1953 as amended). 
3. Ms. McQuown has failed to prove a prima facie case 
of sex discrimination with respect to the reorganization of KUED 
in 1980, the hiring of Jeannine Gregoire instead of Ms. McQuown 
in the position of Manager of Advertising and Public Information, 
placing Ms. McQuown on probation or any other disciplinef and the 
termination of Ms. McQuown. 
4. Ms. McQuown has failed to prove a prima facie case 
of age discrimination with respect to the reorganization of KUED 
in 1980, the hiring of Jeannine Gregoire instead of Ms. McQuown 
as Manager of Advertising and Public Information, the placing of 
Ms. McQuown on probation or any other discipline or termination 
of Ms. McQuown. 
5. Ms. McQuown has failed to establish a prima facie 
case that she was terminated, disciplined or adversely affected 
in any manner as a result of, or based in whole or in part on 
retaliation for her engaging in protected activity under any of 
the Acts. 
6. Respondent has articulated a legitimate, 
nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory basis for each and every 
employment action taken with respect to Ms. McQuown, including, 
the reorganization, hiring of Jeannine Gregoire, placing Ms. 
McQuown on probation or other employee discipline, and 
termination. 
7. Ms. McQuown has not proven that any of the 
articulated reasons is pretextual. 
8. Ms. McQuown is not entitled to any relief. 
9. The I n d u s t r i a l Commiss ion's d e t e r m i n a t i o n should be 
r e v e r s e d and superceded* 
Dated t h i s \ day of A p r i l , 1 9 8 5 . 
BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS 
District Judge 
DAVID E.(LETA> 
(Subjec t t o o b j e c t i o n s s t a t e d of record) fe 
ATTf7?T 
JvM S"^—. 
l.w-,*' c wt. 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
(Subjec t t o c l a r i f i c a t i o n s s t a t e d of record) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, 
P e t i t i o n e r , : 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
- v - : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH : C i v i l No. C-83-6966 
AND PAULA MCQUOWN, (Judge D a n i e l s ) 
Respondents , 
On Wednesday, February 1 3 , 19 85, the above matter came 
on for hear ing on P e t i t i o n e r ' s p e t i t i o n for a t r i a l de novo 
pursuant t o Utah Code Ann. § 3 4 - 3 5 - 8 (1953 as amended) from an 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n D i v i s i o n r u l i n g adverse 
t o p e t i t i o n e r and f a v o r a b l e t o the r e s p o n d e n t s . A s s i s t a n t 
Attorney General Wi l l iam T. Evans appeared in b e h a l f of the 
p e t i t i o n e r , and David E. L e t a , of Hansen, J o n e s , Maycock and 
L e t a , appeared on b e h a l f of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s . The Court had 
p r e v i o u s l y reviewed the e n t i r e record from the I n d u s t r i a l 
Commission a s s t i p u l a t e d t o by t h e p a r t i e s . In a d d i t i o n t o t h e 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission record the Court heard b r i e f sworn 
t e s t i m o n y from Paula McQuown, respondent , and Fred E s p l i n and 
L s/U-^---
Jeannine Gregoire, representatives of petitioner. Counsel argued 
the case and submitted it to the Court. 
The Court having reviewed the record, having observed 
and heard brief testimony from principal witnesses, and having 
heard arguments ana representations from counsel, and being now 
fully advised in tik .. ,ses, hereby makes the following 
findings of facts and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. Charging party in the Industrial Commission and 
respondent here, Paula McQuown (hereafter Ms. McQuown), is a 
female and from at least October, 1980, is and has been over 40 
years of age. Respondent University of Utah has been an employer 
within the meaning of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 34-35-1 et seq. (1953 as amended). 
2. Ms. McQuown was hired in 1971 at KUED as a 
receptionist (4/19 page 62; R-4 2). She had previous secretarial-
receptionist experience at KSL-TV in Salt Lake City (5/25 page 
52), an advertising firm of BBD and 0 in San Francisco (5/25 page 
50); and Station KRON-TV in San Francisco (5/25 pages 50-52; R-
42). 
3. In 1972, Ms. McQuown was assigned as Promotion 
Director (4/19 page 61). 
4. Rex Campbell was the Manager of KUED (4/19 page 7), 
and was, at that time, approximately 55 years old (4/19 page 35). 
5. Ms. McQuown was directly supervised by Byron 
Openshaw (male, approximately 55 years old then) (4/19 page 35). 
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6. There were clashes between Ms. McQuown and Byron 
Openshaw and at times she appeared upset, irritated, agitated, 
and angry (4/19 pages 13, 23). 
7. Rex Campbell left his position in 1975 (4/19 page 
7), and Milt Davis assumed responsibility of Acting Director 
(4/19 page 25/ 5/20 page 19). Milt Davis acted as Ms. McQuown1s 
direct supervisor for approximately six (6) months because Byron 
Openshaw complained he could not get work done from her and was 
having difficulty (5/20 page 24). 
8. On March 9, 1976, Byron Openshaw notified Ms. 
McQuown of concerns he had regarding the handling of her 
position. The three concerns were that she did not seem "to 
establish any priority system in (her) work schedule"; "assumed 
responsibilities which (had) not been specifically assigned": 
and, she had "difficulty ... within per personal 
relationships — — — not only with other members of the staff 
but with (her) supervisor and the station manager". She was 
given thirty (30) days to improve (P-l). 
9. Milt Davis found that she took an inordinate amount 
of time to do her work, thus involving excessive compensatory 
time, consistently missed deadlines. She didn't get along with 
others, including her supervisors (4/20 pages 38-39). 
10. In 1976, Robert Reed was appointed Station Manger 
(4/19 page 72) . 
11. Ms. McQuown had asked for assistance or support 
help and a person named Carol Klas (female) was hired. 
-3-
12. In approximately 1977, Carol Klas was made 
supervisor over Ms. McQuown (4/19 page 75). 
13. On June 28, 1977, Robert Reed (male, over 40) 
(5/21 page 18) criticized Ms. McQuown in writing because her 
"attitude toward (her) assigned supervisor as expressed in (her) 
impassioned and vitriolic criticism of her background, training, 
experience and capabilities (was) counterproductive". He placed 
her on notice that there must be "marked improvement" or she 
would be asked to leave (P-3). 
14. Subsequent to that, Greg Hunt (male, under 40) was 
made supervisor over both Carol Klas and Ms. McQuown (4/19 page 
77) . 
15. In December, 1977, Greg Hunt did the first formal 
evaluation on Ms. McQuown (4/19 page 78, P-5). In this 
evaluation, it was observed that Ms. McQuown has "occasional 
periods of lack of enthusiasm and inflexibility," her output was 
"below sufficient levels" and indicated as an area for 
improvement her "attitude towards and reactions to supervisor" 
(P-5) . 
16. In 1978, Robert Reed was replaced by Milt Davis 
who, again, was Acting Director. Ms. McQuown continued to 
perform the same duties under the direction of Steve Smith, who 
was then her immediate supervisor (4/19 page 91). 
17. On March 28, 1979, Steve Smith evaluated Ms. 
McQuown as superior (P-7). Shortly thereafter, on April 11, 
1979, Steve Smith changed her title to Manager of Publicity and 
Public Relations under a revised structure, commending her for 
her work in per previous job (P-8) . 
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18 . Ms* McQuown has o f ten reques ted suppor t he lp and 
claimed t o be overworked dur ing her e n t i r e work h i s t o r y a t KUED. 
In t h e sp r ing of 1979, a p a r t - t i m e a s s i s t a n t , Becky Sowards, was 
ass igned t o Ms. McQuown, whom she shared with the Manager of 
A d v e r t i s i n g and Promotion. As a s s i s t a n t named Gene Baierschmidt 
was a l s o s e l e c t e d for Jona than Sack, t he manager of Fund R a i s i n g . 
19. On April 11, 1979, a reorganization was effected 
which placed three managers under the Marketing Director, Steve 
Smith, which was Jonathan Sack, Manager of Fund Raising, Norma 
Tharp, Manager of Advertising and Promotion, and Ms. McQuown, 
Manager of Publicity and Public Relations (4/19, pages 97, 102-
104) . 
20. In May, 1979, Bruce Christensen was selected as 
General Manager (5/19, pages 198-186). 
21. Ms. McQuown reported directly to Bruce Christensen 
for several months (4/19, page 108). 
22. Fred Esplin was hired as Director of Marketing of 
KUED in September, 1979. In that position, he was Ms. McQuown1s 
immediate supervisor. As a result of inquiries from Norma Tharp 
regarding salary disparities between her salary and of Jonathan 
Sack, Fred Esplin helped initiate an unsolicited pay raise for 
Ms. McQuown as well to equalize the pay level of Ms. McQuown,. 
Norma Tharp, and Jonathan Sack, who were at that time on the same 
administrative level (5/21, page 56). 
23. In January, 1980, Fred Esplin evaluated Ms. 
McQuown (P-10). She was evaluated effective in publicity and PR 
roles, editing Fanfare and working with the press. However, she 
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was evaluated as needing improvement in initiating and planning 
special events, screenings, assuming fiscal and production 
oversight for Fanfare and developing target mailings. She was 
encouraged to keep Fanfare going out one week prior to the end of 
the month, initiating and presenting three special events for the 
year and developing a plan. At this time Fred Esplin also 
evaluated Jonathan Sack (male, under 40), Manager of Fund Raising 
Services and found strengths and deficiencies in his performance 
comparable to those of Ms. McQuown. 
24. In March, 1980, Fred Esplin discussed personally 
with Ms. McQuown concerns he had regarding her work performance 
and on March 31, 19 80, (P-11) he wrote a memo placing Ms. McQuown 
on probation, giving her only an eight per cent raise, subject to 
subsequent evaluation. She received and signed this on April 3, 
1980. The problem areas identified included (1) use of time, (2) 
fiscal oversight of FanfareF (3) production oversight of Fanfare, 
and (4) lack of organization and planning. Twelve specific 
assignments were listed as being required to accomplish and a 
timetable was given. She was placed on notice that on a 
subsequent evaluation, if she had not responded adequately to 
these concerns, she would be given notice of termination. Fred 
Esplin further clarified these concerns and responded to a memo 
from her regarding her evaluation, giving suggestions and 
encouragement on April 23, 1980 (R-3). Jonathan Sack was not 
similarly evaluated again because he responded positively to the 
concerns identified in January. The importance of his area, the 
kinds of concerns, the nature of his response, and his overall 
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performance justified any difference in treatment between him and 
Ms. McQuown and it was not the result of any illegal 
discrimination or retaliation. 
25. On May 4, 1980, (P-12), Ms. McQuown responded to 
the March 31, 1980) (P-ll) memorandum. Her response constituted 
a general denial and justification for all matters referred to in 
the memorandum or discussion. 
26. On May 13, 1980, Fred Esplin responded (R-5) and 
answered her implied and expressed inquiries. 
27. On May 5, 1980, Fred Esplin gave an interim 
evaluation indicating satisfaction of six of twelve items 
mentioned (P-13). 
28. On June 4, 1980, Fred Esplin recommended an 
increase from eight per cent to eleven per cent (P-16) based on 
her attempt to respond to the specific items. Eleven per cent 
was average for the station. Ms. McQuown did not complete all 
the assignments but was developing and appeared to have made an 
effort (5/25, page 35). 
29. Having requested that Ms. McQuown prepare an 
annual report, having discussed the annual report and reminded 
her of it on several occasions (March 31, 1980, P-ll; May 5, 
1980, P-13; May 13, 1980, R-4; July 21, 1980, R-6), the annual 
report finally had to be reassigned and completed by Ms. 
McQuown's assistant, Becky Sowards (5/24, page 149). An 
abbreviated version of the annual report appeared in the Fanfare 
magazine in August, 1980 and was subsequently issued in full form 
in the fall (5/24, pages 148-149). 
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30. On July 25, 1980, Fred Esplin was notified that an 
important press kit on the Herbie Mann jazz concert had been late 
in mailing (R-7). It was Ms. McQuownfs responsibility and a 
significant function that caused concern to Fred Esplin (5.24, 
page 50). 
31. In September and October, 1980, a reorganization 
of the Marketing Department was accomplished. This was done by 
Fred Esplin in consultation with Bruce Christensen and personnel 
at other public television stations. It had been under 
consideration for several months. Its purpose and motivation 
were to benefit the fund raising capacity in the Marketing 
Department (5/20, page 113; 5/21, page 50) and also to match 
individual skills and abilities, including those of Ms. McQuown, 
with assignments to make them more compatible while at the same 
time creating a viable organization which would withstand changes 
in personnel (5/24, pages 56-62). 
32. The reorganization changed the organization of the 
Marketing Department area in which Ms. McQuown (Manager of 
Publicity and Public Relations) and Norma Tharp (Manager of 
Advertising/Promotion) worked by, essentially, creating a new 
level of management over those two areas (between Ms. McQuown and 
the Director of Marketing where previously there had been a 
direct supervision of Ms. McQuown by the Director of Marketing, 
Fred Esplin) (P-9, P-22). Ms. McQuown had complained of being 
overworked, so some of her work load was reduced. 
33. In the new reorganization, the position of 
Coordinator of Editorial Services was filled by Becky Sowards (P-
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9) and the position of Coordinator of Publicity and Public 
Relations continued to be filled by Ms. McQuown. There was a 
change of name and a change in duties in that she was relieved of 
the obligations to Fanfare, which were transferred to Becky 
Sowards, (5/24, pages 60-61) and Ms. McQuown was given some minor 
liaison responsibility concerning KUER Radio (5/19, page 37). 
Ms. McQuown had expressed concern on previous occasions at the 
amount of time that the Fanfare magazine was taking from her (R-
1, 5/19, page 23). 
34. Ms. McQuown1s job continued at the same grade, 
step and pay level as determined by the University of Utah 
Personnel Department, so it was not an actual demotion (5/21, 
page 28-29). However, it did have the effect of moving others up 
and placing an additional level of supervision between Ms. 
McQuown and the Director of Marketing, Fred Esplin (P-22). Ms. 
McQuown considered it a demotion in terms of prestige and 
responsibility (5/20, page 108-109). 
35. Ms. McQuown1s skills and abilities were considered 
in the reorganization. Fred Esplin considered her to have not 
demonstrated skills in fiscal and production management but felt 
her writing and public relations skills were beneficial (5/24, 
pages 57-62). Ms. McQuown expressed concern on September 16, 
1980, concerning the effect of this reorganization upon her (P-
18). See job description for new position of Coordinator of 
Publicity in Public Relations (R-8). 
36. Formal notification of this reorganization came on 
September 30, 1980, in a memorandum from Fred Esplin (P-19). 
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37. Some of the purposes of the reorganization were 
fiscal, but the reorganization did not result in a direct or 
immediate savings of money; rather, it resulted ultimately in 
providing greater effectiveness for the Fund Raising Services 
area (5/24, page 31) where pressure was felt to compensate the 
loss of federal money by increasing private support. This effect 
proved to be successful (5/24, pages 31, 57) . 
38. The position of Manager of Advertising and Public 
Information was not filled at that time and Fred Esplin made the 
determination to advertise it publicly (5/24, page 131). 
39. The University policy on internal promotions at 
that time was that they should be done "whenever possible" (P-
21). Fred Esplin understood that policy to mean that University 
employees received preference, all else being equal, but not 
vested rights in any position. Advertising this position did not 
violate University policy (5/24, pages 175-176; 5/21, pages 24-
25) . 
40 On or about October 9, 1980, Jeannine Diane 
Gregoire applied for the position of Manager of Advertising and 
Public Information at KUED. She had previous experience in media 
advertising, public relations, and promotions at KPIX, Channel 5, 
San Francisco as Assistant Creative Services Manager and Audience 
Promotion Manager; KTVX, Channel 4 (Salt Lake City) as 
Advertising Manager, and Assistant Sales Promotion Advertising 
Manager, at KTVX, Channel 4 (Salt Lake City) as Public Service 
Director (R-9). She was minimally qualified (P-40) . 
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41. On or about October 14, 1980, Ms. McQuown applied 
for the position of Manager of Advertising and Public Information 
at KUED. For the previous ten years, her work experience in this 
area was at KUED as Promotion Director, Promotion/Publicity 
Specialist, and Manager of Publicity and Public Relations (R-10). 
She was minimally qualified (P-4Q). 
42. Ms. McQuown discussed the position and her 
application with Fred Esplin. At that time, there was a request 
for her to present on-air copy and advertising material. She 
supplied the on-air copy but did not present the advertising 
material (5/24, page 69; 5/25, page 54). 
43. Jeannine Gregoire interviewed for the position 
with Fred Esplin. He requested additional examples of on-air 
copy and advertising material which she supplied in accordance 
with his request (5/24, page 173). 
44. Fred Esplin contacted the prior supervisors of 
Jeannine Gregoire who were involved in media responsibilities. 
He did not contact her supervisors at her then-present job at 
Xerox because she had requested that his not be done (as she 
still worked there); and the position she then held at Xerox did 
not have any significance with regard to the duties she would 
assume if she were selected at KUED. All supervisors contacted 
were positive regarding Jeannine Gregoire. 
45. Fred Esplin contacted previous supervisors of Ms. 
McQuown who had worked with her at KUED including Rex Campbell, 
Byron Openshaw, Milt Davis, Steve Smith, Greg Hunt, Bob Reed, and 
Bruce Christensen (5/24, pages 75-76). All were negative except 
Rex Campbell. 
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46. On October 26, 1980, Fred Esplin notified Ms. 
McQuown that she was not selected for the position. On or about 
that same time, she received a notification from Personnel, dated 
October 24, 1980 to the same effect (4/21, page 141). 
47. On October 28, 1980, Fred Esplin became aware of a 
missed deadline with regard to the "Messiah" press kit and so 
notified Ms. McQuown (R-ll). This was of considerable concern to 
Mr. Esplin because of the significance of this production (5/24, 
pages 51-53) . 
48. On November 10, 1980, it was learned that Fanfares 
were late and Fred Esplin notified Ms. McQuown of his awareness 
of this and his concern (R-13). 
49. On November 25, 1980, Fred Esplin became aware of 
the failure to meet deadline with respect to the "Deadly Winds of 
Ware". This caused him considerable concern and he notified her 
of his concern and the fact that another similar instance would 
be grounds for termination. This was of particular concern 
because the publicity for the "Deadly Winds of War" had been 
discussed at length sufficiently prior to the deadline for it to 
be acted upon, and memoranda were exchanged (October 1, November 
6, November 7, November 10 (R-14)). 
50. On November 26, 19 80, Ms. McQuown filed a charge 
of discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and 
EEOC alleging sex and age discrimination, in the failure to 
select Ms. McQuown for the position of Manager of Advertising and 
Public Information, and in the threat of termination on the 
previous day, November 25, 1980, and in the reorganization which 
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resulted in an alleged demotion. She based her allegation on the 
statement that a youngerr male employee in a similar position was 
not demoted and her belief that she was better qualified than the 
individual selected for the position (Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division record)• 
51. On or about December 1, 1980, Jeannine Gregoire 
began functioning as Manager of Advertising and Public 
Information at KUED (5/21, page 73). She met Ms. McQuown and 
also reviewed job descriptions for those under her supervision, 
including Ms. McQuown. Fred Esplin did not notify her that Ms. 
McQuown had applied for her position, nor that Ms. McQuown had 
filed a charge of sex and age discrimination relative to her 
circumstances at KUED nor of Fred Esplin1s opinion concerning Ms. 
McQuown's work product, abilities or skills (5/24, page 81). He 
avoided telling her this to prevent her from having any prejudice 
in hopes that Jeannine Gregoire1s working relationship with Ms. 
McQuown would be satisfactory and beneficial to the Station 
(Id.) . 
52. On or about December 9, 1980, Ms. McQuown was 
notified, along with Becky Sowards, of their new job 
responsibilities (R-15). 
53. Jeannine Gregoire perceived that from the very 
outset Ms. McQuown treated her with a condescending and 
unresponsive attitude (5/21, page 74). After three or four weeks 
of this, probably toward the end of December, 19 80, Jeannine 
Gregoire heard through the grapevine of the discrimination charge 
(5/21, page 78), and inquired of Fred Esplin concerning Ms. 
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McQuown1s apparent attitude and lack of responsiveness (5/21, 
pages 78-79). At that time, he discussed with her the fact that 
Ms. McQuown had sought her same position, had filed a charge of 
discrimination. He indicated to her his practice, in the event 
of employee problems of this kind, to be to document the 
interaction and assignments relative to the employee (5/21, page 
86) . 
54. Fred Esplin has handled a similar problem in a 
similar way involving a male, under 40, presently at the Station 
who has been placed on probation (5/24, page 32; 5/21, page 22). 
This is the only other person Fred Esplin has placed on 
probation. Jeannine Gregoire has also handled similar employee 
problems with employees under her supervision; specifically, a 
male, under 40, employee she formerly supervised in San Francisco 
(5/21, page 127). 
55. In January, 1981, Fred Esplin evaluated Ms. 
McQuown's performance as "marginal1' (P-23). Even though Jeannine 
Gregoire was her supervisor, he evaluated her, noting as areas 
for improvement the meeting of deadlines, initiation of special 
events, better planning and goal setting and more careful 
attention to policies ("requisitions, etc."), because he was 
familiar with her previous year's performance and Jeannine 
Gregoire had not yet had sufficient experience supervising Ms. 
McQuown to give her a well-founded appraisal (5/24, page 85). 
Ms. McQuown had previously complained of supervisors who had not 
been on the job very long when they evaluated her (4/21, page 
80). Fred Esplin informed Ms. McQuown that because of her being 
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placed on probation, because of her marginal rating and because a 
new supervisor would want to evaluate her soon anyway, she would 
have another evaluation later in the year (5/24, pages 84-85). 
The University policy regarding employee evaluations is that they 
should be done at lease once a year but nothing precludes 
additional evaluations during the year, particularly when an 
employee is placed on probation or other extenuating 
circumstances are involved. 
56. On or about February, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire 
inquired of Fred Esplin concerning whether or not Ms. McQuown's 
discrimination claim, if successful, would have any bearing on 
Jeannine Gregoire1s own position. She was assured that it would 
have no bearing and she was not in jeopardy of losing her job 
regardless of the outcome. Jeannine Gregoire had previously 
filed a charge of sex discrimination and was not critical of Ms. 
McQuown for having filed a discrimination charge. 
57. On February 2, 1981, Ms. McQuown responded to the 
marginal evaluation (P-24). This constituted denial, 
justification, and re-counting of her perce accomplishments 
during the year and was a protest in the s t of indignation 
and complete denial relative to the evaluc on (P-24). 
58. On February 2, 1981, Ms. McQuown was given an 
assignment relative to a "Big Bird Coloring Contest" by Jeannine 
Gregoire but on February 10, 1981, in response to a question from 
Jeannine Gregoire in staff meeting concerning what had been done 
on the contest she said "I don't know". This was of considerable 
concern to Jeannine Gregoire who notified her of this concern. 
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Ms. McQuown1s stated reason for this was with respect to 
confusion relative to J. C. Penney1s participation in this 
program. However, Jeannine Gregoire still reasonably perceived 
this response as a failure to follow through on an assignment and 
particularly indicative of an attitude of condescension and 
unresponsiveness. 
59. On February 3, 1980, Ms. McQuown was requested to 
check with individuals in the Fund Raising Services Department 
concerning their need for the Fanfare Magazine before she sent 
the rest of the magazines out. However, Ms. McQuown sent such 
magazines without checking with these people which caused them to 
be short and to be inconvenienced (R-17). Ms. McQuown states 
that in her opinion she left sufficient numbers. However, Ms. 
McQuown's supervisor, Jeannine Gregoire nevertheless justifiably 
considered this a specific failure to follow instructions which 
resulted in considerable inconvenience to the Station (R-17, 18). 
60. On April 9, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire requested 
assistance from Ms. McQuown by finding an ad for "Firing Line". 
She responded by telling her supervisor she could not find it but 
when Jeannine Gregoire looked for it it was clearly in the exact 
file where she had been told to look. This was, in itself, a 
small matter, but her supervisor considered it another instance 
of lack of responsiveness and poor attitude toward her 
supervisor. Ms. McQuown considered this a clerical 
responsibility not consistent with her job description. It was 
not assigned in any punitive manner and was not unreasonable 
considering her job description and relationship with her 
supervisor in the Station on such matters. 
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61. In March, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire requested Ms, 
McQuown to prepare a press release on Allyson Beecher. On April 
23, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire learned that the press release4 on 
Allyson had not been accomplished and so notified Ms. McQuown and 
requested that it be done (R-20, 21). As an isolated instance, 
this might be considered another small matter but it was 
reasonably perceived by Ms. McQuown1s supervisor as a failure to 
follow instructions and indicative of lack of responsiveness in 
her attitude. 
62. On May 12, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire requested Ms. 
McQuown to prepare schedules. In checking back with Ms. McQuown 
as to why these were not prepared, Jeannine Gregoire was informed 
by Ms. McQuown that Becky Sowards was doing this. Jeannine 
Gregoire checked with Becky Sowards who indicated that she had 
not been assigned this task, was not doing it, and indicated her 
understanding that Ms. McQuown had always had this responsibility 
(R-22). This matter was indicative of a lack of responsiveness 
and poor attitude toward her supervisor as well as co-workers, 
63. On June 5, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire performed an 
evaluation on Ms. McQuown (R-24) in which she was graded 
"marginal" and, in effect, placed on probation. In attempting to 
locate Ms. McQuown in order to discuss such evaluation, it was 
Jeannine Gregoire1s reasonable perception that Paula McQuown 
avoided her. Ms. McQuown testified of the events of this time in 
not being able to make contact with Jeannine Gregoire as 
involving an extremely busy work schedule as well as being sick. 
Jeannine Gregoire had reached the point that she did not trust 
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Ms. McQuown and perceived the allegation of being sick as well as 
suggestion that she was too busy as excuses which were not 
justifiable but only attempts to avoid meeting. Under the 
circumstances/ no other work Ms. McQuown did at that time was as 
important as meeting with her supervisor. 
64. On or about June 2, 1981, Ms. McQuown requested 
that KUED send her to a PBS conference in New York. KUED had 
paid her way to at least two other conferences. She was told 
that this time Jeannine Gregoire would be the official Station 
representative at that conference. Ms. McQuown then attempted to 
go directly to Larry Smith to obtain funds for the conference but 
was told that she could only have funds if she were to go through 
her supervisor, Jeannine Gregoire. This information was relayed 
to Jeannine Gregoire, who considered it a clear attempt to ignore 
the previous dec3 *on that Ms. McQuown would not receive funds 
for that conference *. to go behind her supervisor's back to 
others in the Station (R-38). 
65. On June 18, 1981, while Ms. McQuown was on her 
vacation, Jeannine Gregoire recommended to Fred Esplin that Ms. 
McQuown be terminated based on her experience in supervising her 
over the last six months and Ms. McQuown's inability and 
ineffectiveness in performing the work (R-24). 
66. Jeannine Gregoire's prior experience that Ms. 
McQuown1s job performance would have more than justified 
termination at any other employment with which Ms. Gregoire was 
familiar. 
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67. This recommendation was reviewed by University of 
Utah Personnel Department, who recommended that in the spirit of 
University policies recommending progressive discipline such 
termination would not be appropriate and a lesser sanction should 
first be imposed. The decision of whether or not to terminate 
was, nevertheless, left to the Department which included Fred 
Esplin and Bruce Christensen, It was determined to follow the 
recommendation of Personnel and not terminate Ms. McQuown at that 
time (R-25). Bruce Christensen's memorandum indicating the 
University "required" that Ms. McQuown not be terminated was, as 
admitted by Mr. Christensen, a misstatement or 
mischaracterization of his understanding inasmuch as he knew the 
decision rested with him and the advice from Personnel was only 
advisory. There is no evidence of intent to hurt Ms. McQuown by 
this decision; but, to the contrary, was an attempt to benefit 
her and give her every opportunity to succeed. 
68. On June 26, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire wrote a 
memorandum to Paula McQuown indicating that she would be 
suspended for one day for the perceived insubordination relative 
to the failure to meet with her supervisor prior to leaving. She 
was placed on probation (R-26). She requested that Ms. McQuown 
meet immediately with her supervisor on her return to KUED after 
vacation. 
69. On June 30, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire wrote to Ms. 
McQuown placing her on probation (R-27) and reminding her of her 
failure to discuss this matter with her prior to leaving on 
vacation, she notified her that there was no raise forthcoming 
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unless her performance improved, at which time a six per cent 
retroactive raise would be given. Ms. McQuown was reminded to 
meet with her supervisor immediately upon her reporting back to 
work (R-27). 
70. On June 30, 1981, Ms. McQuown was to return to 
work but notified the receptionist that she could not receive a 
flight out of San Francisco. Jeannine Gregoire contacted three 
carriers operating between San Francisco and Salt Lake City and 
found that in all cases there were available seats on the 
flights. Jeannine Gregoire perceived this as evidence of a 
dishonest response from Ms. McQuown. She notified Ms. McQuown by 
memorandum that she should contact her supervisor directly rather 
than leaving word with the receptionist. However, she did not 
indicate that she had been in direct contact with any air 
carriers and did not confront her with this matter. 
71. On July 1, 1981, Ms. McQuown returned to work. In 
spite of several memoranda requesting her immediate contact of 
her supervisor, she failed to do so (R-29). 
72. On July 1, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire again 
recommended to Fred Esplin Ms. McQuown's termination based on her 
additional failure to respond to requests to meet with her 
supervisor (R-29). 
73. On July 7, 1981, Ms. McQuown was to take her one 
day of suspension, which is a day she choose. Instead of failing 
to come into work, she showed up in the office in the morning, 
spoke with another employee for approximately one hour and twenty 
minutes. She was reminded that she was on suspension and it was 
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inappropriate for her to appear in the office at which time she 
left. Jeannine Gregoire considered this another act of 
insubordination and total unresponsiveness to orders (R-30, 31). 
74. On July 9, 1981, Ms. McQuown sent a written 
response to Jeannine Gregoire regarding the marginal evaluation 
of June 5th and the memorandum of June 30th. This constituted a 
general denial of any justification for the employee action 
taken. 
75. On July 17, 1981, Ms. McQuown wrote another 
memorandum to Jeannine Gregoire protesting the memorandum of June 
26, 1981 regarding the one-day suspension and six-months 
probation. This response constituted a general denial of any 
wrongdoing and attempted justification for all conduct of Ms. 
McQuown (P-26). On July 21, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire responded to 
Ms. McQuown1s concerns, identifying several of the major problems 
perceived by Jeannine Gregoire relative to Ms. McQuown1s work 
performance (R-32). It appears that Ms. McQuown did not respond 
in writing to this memorandum. 
76. On September 1, 1981, Ms. McQuown wrote a 
memorandum to Jeannine Gregoire protesting an assignment she 
received in a staff meeting to assist with a children's Halloween 
party to be aired over KUED (P-28). It was a protest that others 
of her own "projects ... take precedence here". Both the verbal 
and written comments concerning this assignment were considered 
by Jeannine Gregoire to be "out of line and insubordinate" and 
she no notified Ms. McQuown (R-33). In connection with this same 
period of time, there was another verbal exchange between Ms. 
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McQuown and Jeannine Gregoire on September 2, 1981, which 
Jeannine Gregoire also considered to be insubordinate (R-33, 38). 
77. On October 2, 1981, Ms. McQuown was requested by 
her supervisor to prepare program descriptions for underwriters 
(R-34, 38). Ms. McQuown did not complete this task, justifying 
such failure because she considered this not within her job 
description. It was within her job description. 
78. On November 25, 1981, Ms. McQuown was requested to 
prepare bold fact listings (R-36). She did it grudgingly, 
stating that she considered it to be "clerical" and did so in a 
manner that caused her supervisor to write a critical memorandum 
to her on November 25, 1981 (R-36). On November 25, 1981, a 
memorandum was prepared from Jeannine Gregoire to Ms. McQuown and 
delivered December 1, 1981 (R-36) notifying her of a number of 
concerns her supervisor had in her performance. 
79. The concerns at this time extended over a 
considerable period of time and included problems with Ms. 
McQuown not following procedures relative to purchases. Although 
the strict purchase order policy is sometimes not followed by 
employees and is not a completely unusual omission, Ms. McQuown1s 
failure to follow such procedures was a matter of long-standing 
concern to many of her supervisors and co-workers and her problem 
exceeded that of any other employee (R-35, 37, 38, 12). 
80. Ms. McQuown failed to perform her work 
satisfactorily during her final probationary period. 
81. On December 15, 1981, Jeannine Gregoire 
recommended that based on Ms. McQuown1s failure to adequately 
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perform during her probationary period she should be terminated 
(R-38). 
82. On December 17f 1981, Jeannine Gregoire wrote 
another memorandum regarding Ms. McQuown's performance 
recommending termination for failure to perform her job duty in 
an acceptable manner during the probationary period (R-39). 
83. On January 12, 1982, Ms. McQuown received notice 
of termination (P-30). 
84. Ms. McQuown was replace by a female. 
85. On February 8f 1982, Ms. McQuown filed a charge of 
discrimination with the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and 
EEOC alleging sex and age discrimination and illegal retaliation 
relative to her termination from employment. 
86. The reasons for Ms. McQuown1s termination were her 
failures in performing her assigned duties as described in her 
job description and insubordination to her supervisor. 
Specifically, she (1) failed to plan and initiate an aggressive, 
comprehensive publicity and public relations program; (2) failed 
to prepare press kits and press releases in a reasonable number 
or in a timely manner; (3) failed to create a speakers1 bureau; 
(4) failed to create special promotional campaigns; (5) failed to 
perform other duties as assigned and as reasonably related or 
specifically contemplated by her job description. (5/24, pages 
90-96). 
87. To the extent there has been any difference in 
treatment, terms or conditions of employment between Ms. McQuown 
and any other male, female or younger employees, these difference 
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have been based on legitimate, work-related circumstances, needs, 
skills, abilities, and were unrelated to Ms. McQuown's sex, age, 
or her engaging in protected activity. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties and 
subject matter. 
2. University of Utah is an employer within the 
meaning of Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-
2(5) (1953 as amended). 
3. Ms. McQuown has failed to prove a prima facie case 
of sex discrimination with respect to the reorganization of KUED 
in 1980, the hiring of Jeannine Gregoire instead of Ms. McQuown 
in the position of Manager of Advertising and Public Information, 
placing Ms. McQuown on probation or any other discipline, and the 
termination of Ms. McQuown. 
4. Ms. McQuown has failed to prove a prima facie case 
of age discrimination with respect to the reorganization of KUED 
in 1980, the hiring of Jeannine Gregoire instead of Ms. McQuown 
as Manager of Advertising and Public Information, the placing of 
Ms. McQuown on probation or any other discipline or termination 
of Ms. McQuown. 
5. Ms. McQuown has failed to establish a prima facie 
case that she was terminated, disciplined or adversely affected 
in any manner as a result of, or based in whole or in part on 
retaliation for her engaging in protected activity under any of 
the Acts. 
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6. Respondent has articulated a legitimate, 
nonpretextual, nondiscriminatory basis for each and every 
employment action taken with respect to Ms* McQuownf including, 
the reorganization hiring of Jeannine Gregoire, placing Ms. 
McQuown on probation or other employee discipline, and 
termination. 
7. Ms, McQuown has not proven that any of the 
articulated reasons is pretextual. 
8. Ms. McQuown is not entitled to any relief. 
9. The Industrial Commission's determination should be 
reversed and superceded. 
Dated this day of March, 19 85. 
BY THE COURT 
/ ' ( : \ (''- • ' ! : ({ ' 
HONORABLE SOOTT DANIELS 
District Judge 
Approved as to Form: 
DAVID E. LETA 
WILLIAM T. EVANS 
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